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Three Stories About Nature:
Property, the Environment, and
Ecosystem Services
by Keith H. Hirokawa
I.

INTRODUCTION

Property is the process of dividing the world into bits that may be
subjected to private control.' As such, how we understand the world,
its characteristics, and its processes is very important. If, for instance,
we think of water as an infinite resource that serves growth needs, we
might not be concerned with how that resource is acquired, used, or even
wasted. On the other hand, if we believe that water is a scarce and
essential resource, we may find that an allocation scheme bears the
weight of accomplishing many social and economic objectives. Nature
matters because our understanding of the world matters to the manner
in which we construct rights to property. Of course, at some point, the
converse also obtains: how we conceive of property influences what we
enjoy, fear, and want in the world. A new understanding of nature may
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School. Ursinus College (B.A., 1994);
University of Connecticut School of Law (J.D., 1998); Lewis and Clark Law School (LL.M.,
2001); University of Connecticut, Department of Philosophy (M.A., 2003). Member, State
Bars of Washington and Oregon.
The Author would like to thank several people for their insightful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article, including Timothy Mulvaney, Robin Kundis Craig, Marc Poirier,
Katrina Kuh, and Dorothy Hill. The Author appreciates the efforts of the entire faculty
at Albany Law School for comments received during a workshop presentation of this
Article. Thanks also go to Anna Binau, Charles Gottlieb, and Nikki Nielson for their
research assistance. Finally, this Article greatly benefitted from comments received at the
2011 AALS Annual meeting as a selected paper in the "New Voices on Cutting Edge Issues
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Sections on Natural Resources and Environmental Law.
1.

See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON

GOOD 168 (2003).
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be resisted precisely because it undermines the persuasiveness of the
way we protect possessions as property. Property and nature are
codependent, but their connection is an indeterminate one.
When we view both nature and property as social constructions,2 it
becomes apparent that the terms "property," "environment," and the
more recent description of nature based on "ecosystem services" can often
be used interchangeably. At least, it should not be surprising that these
terms share some common ground, as they share the same referent(s).
Yet advocates from different perspectives certainly do not agree on the
meaning of these terms or the values that they invoke, and it is to these
divergent perspectives that this Article is addressed. These terms,
whether considered synonymous or divergent, reflect on the contingency
of an inevitable and ongoing clash of values that results when we allow
rights to vest in natural things.
With this in mind, consider a slight modification of the rivalry
between the two notorious hunters, Pierson and Post.' In this modified
story, Pierson and Post remain on the hunt. However, at some point in
the pursuit, Post recognizes that his efforts are not bearing fruits. Post
shoulders his gun, leashes his hounds of imperial descent, and turns his
efforts to more constructive projects (whether he intends to abandon the
hunt we will never know). He digs up and destroys the fox's lair, levels
the forest, relocates nearby streams, and forcefully removes all fowl and
other creatures relied upon by the fox for food. The fox goes hungry,
thirsty, and unprotected from the elements. The fox soon grows close to
death. Yet just before the fox dies from these "natural" causes, Pierson
spots the fox out in the open, springs, then strikes the fox with a mortal
blow and leaves with fox in hand. Post, of course, sues for conversion.
As the story goes, the success of Post's claim depends on whether his

2. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 183 (Anchor Books 1967) (1966).

Man is biologically predestined to construct and to inhabit a world with others.
This world becomes for him the dominant and definitive reality. Its limits are set
by nature, but once constructed, this world acts back upon nature. In the dialectic
between nature and the socially constructed world the human organism itself is
transformed. In this same dialectic man produces reality and thereby produces
himself.
Id.; see also William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND:
TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 23, 52 (William Cronon ed., 1995); Anna Peterson,
Environmental Ethics and the Social Construction of Nature, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 339, 346
(1999); Mick Smith, To Speak of Trees: Social Constructivism,Environmental Values, and

the Future of Deep Ecology, 21 ENvTL. ETHICs 359, 375 (1999).
3. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), for a discussion of the original
rivalry.
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actions were sufficient to reduce the fox to "property" and vest an
entitlement.
The force of Post's claim largely depends on the manner in which law
constructs boundaries and apportions the world into units of ownership.
The premise for this claim of contingency, of course, is that property
always appears to be in a state of flux, which is reflected in its constant
process of negotiation with and adaptation to new social needs and
systemic challenges.' In this process, the meaning of property is pulled
and pushed, not only because property is a legal construct (and law
generally struggles under such tensions)6 but also because property
influences how we understand ourselves both individually and as we
The very idea of property is fundamental and
relate to others.'
foundational, but it is also dependent upon purposes we want it to serve.
It is within this context of contingency that this Article offers three
different possible resolutions to the modified dialogue between Pierson
and Post. These are not just different stories about different laws
(which, of course, they are): the three answers-Property, the Environment, and Ecosystem Services-propose different stories about nature
and how law treats things in the world, and each illustrates its own
legal construction of nature.'

4. Id. at 177.
5. See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:Property
as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 291-95 (2002).

6. Eric Freyfogle writes,
Private property is an organic, evolving institution, as the historical record makes
clear to anyone who reads it fairly. Over the generations, the rights and
responsibilities of land ownership have shifted considerably, and legitimately so,
given that private property is, at root, chiefly a tool that lawmaking communities
use to promote their well being. As values, understandings, and circumstances all
change, so too should the mix of rights and responsibilities that landowners
possess.
Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Rights in a Connected Land, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 315, 328 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold. ed., 2005).
7. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 191-201 (1993) (linking
property to identity and self-actualization); see also Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the
Commons and the Myth of a PrivatePropertySolution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 539 (2007)
("What we call things and how we categorize them matters because it influences how we

think about them.").
8. Although it might be obvious, it is probably worth mentioning that the contingencies
of property will tend to bleed into these stories as well, suggesting that there may be no
single description of the relationship between property and nature. While this point may
appear to some to be trivially true, it is important to note that our stories often locate only
the starting point for an analysis of how law constructs a reality that may be unintended-a
point made in great detail by Margaret Jane Radin in her identification of the personhood
incident to property. See RADIN, supra note 7, at 191-201.
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The thesis of this Article is that ecosystem services-the "wide range
of conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the
species that are part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life" 9-will
have a dramatic impact on the relationship between property and
nature, and this impact may be best understood by examining how the
Ecosystem Services story diverges from the legal and rhetorical commitments made in the Property and Environment paradigms. To introduce
the Property story, Part II of this Article relies on the rule of capture,10
which occupies a special place in understanding the things in nature and
how they have historically been subordinated to human use. Under the
rule of capture, the natural world is divided into property and potential
property." The argument made in this Part is that the Property
description of nature emphasizes the importance of boundaries to
delineate claims to things in the world and ascribe value to them. To
introduce the story of the Environment, Part III of this Article considers
environmental and natural resource laws as efforts to transition law into
valuing nature by reference to something other than its potential utility.
The argument made in this Part is that despite the dramatic changes
reflected in the Environment, the transition from Property was made
easier by retaining the central importance of boundaries in the world
and by applying that notion to distinguish Property from the Environment; but as a consequence, nature took on the role of a property defect.
The remainder of this Article concerns the manner in which the trends
toward an Ecosystem Services approach converge or conflict with past
paradigms of nature. Accordingly, Part IV of this Article introduces
Ecosystem Services as a description of the world that is notable for the
way it navigates and reinvents the boundedness of the things of nature
while reconnecting nature to important characteristics of property. The
argument made in this Part is that Ecosystem Services combines the
intent of the Environment with the value embedded in the Property
scheme but modifies value to cast nature as an economic advantage.
Part IV also considers the obstacles to formalizing the Ecosystem
Services understanding of nature as an element of property, including
the difficulties that courts have demonstrated in understanding the
nature of the shift.

9. Gretchen Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by
NaturalEcosystems, 2 ISSUES IN ECOLOGY 1, 2 (1997).
10. See generally Pierson,3 Cai. at 178, 179 (discussing the actions required to acquire

a property right to a wild animal).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.

2011]

THREE STORIES ABOUT NATURE

II.
A.

B.

545

THIs THING CALLED PROPERTY

In the Matter of Pierson v. Post
It is with a strong sense of regret that we concede
that this court is not empowered to award the relief that
Mr. Post seeks. Under the long-standing rules governing
property acquisition, this court awards a superior interest
to the hunter who successfully extends his dominion and
control over the wild and wily beast. In other words, you
have to kill the thing.
We commend Mr. Post on his efforts, and we do
recognize that so great an expense for the public benefit
should not go unrewarded. Yet we remain certain that Mr.
Post will recognize the ease of judicial administration that
accompanies the test we here observe. The rule of capture
does not recognize property rights in an "almost," indirect,
or otherwise incomplete capture.
The rule requires
domination so complete as to deprive the thing of its
natural liberty-a condition that neatly serves the collateral
purpose of notifying others of the successful hunt and
competing claims for the prize.
We also take this moment to suggest that in future
disputes under similar circumstances, Mr. Post might
consider pleading trespass, supported by a claim of title to
the land. Mr. Post has undoubtedly added substantial
value to the land, which is now in a suitable circumstance
for virtually any productive use. Hence, such a claim
might be made under the auspices of adverse possession or
some other patentable claim under statute. Under such a
legitimate claim, this court would have no opportunity but
to award Mr. Post the protection of the law.
Signed, The Court

Things in Nature as Property
Capture is a good starting point for any examination of law's
relationship to nature due to its historical significance in resource
allocation. As the United States began its westward expansion, the
country was faced with the perception of an untamed and dangerous but
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seemingly unending West.12 The rule of capture encouraged the
transformation of resources and the civilization of the West by inviting
private claims to exploration; encouraging mining and patent of federal
lands under the General Mining Act of 1872;' vesting a priority in the
use of water for mining and irrigation purposes under the prior
appropriation doctrine of Western water law; and awarding the right
to harvest forests, graze pastures, and take wildlife and a host of other
resources. With its focus on labor-a uniquely common asset among
pioneers-the rule of capture provided a needed certainty and stability."
In effect, capture encouraged the domination of an untamed nature and
transformation of natural processes in a manner that suited pioneering
needs."

Under the rules set out to resolve the competing claims of Pierson and
Post, an expectation to vest an interest in things in nature as property
is legitimized by intent, labor, and sufficient control. 7 Of course, there

12. Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:
PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 122, 122 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). As

Peter Abeles notes,
Of all the modem industrialized nations, the United States is the only one that
began with what originally seemed to be an endless supply of land. In fact, it was
this seemingly unlimited supply of land that was one of the main reasons for the
continuous immigration that eventually used up so much of the land. One of the
important foundations of this country was that everyone was free to do what he
wanted, partly because of the abundance of land.
Id.

13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-28, 30, 33-35, 37, 39-43, 47 (2006). The General Mining Act of 1872
states that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States ... shall
be free and open to exploration and purchase." Id. § 22.
14. See Janet C. Neuman & Keith Hirokawa, How Good is an Old Water Right? The
Applicationof Statutory ForfeitureProvisionsto Pre-Code WaterRights, 4 U. DENV. WATER

L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2000).
15.

See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV.

1221, 1225-26 (1979) (discussing the difficulties with a labor-based rule of entitlement to
property).
16. This domination and transformation included eliminating the presence of Native
Americans, who were already occupying the lands and interfered with the first possession
idea behind capture. See DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF
LAND 27 (1992).
17.

See Pierson,3 Cai. at 177-79.

That is to say, that actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right to,
or possession of, wild beasts; but that, on the contrary, the mortal wounding of
such beasts, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may, with the utmost propriety,
be deemed possession of him; since thereby the pursuer manifests an unequivocal
intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of
his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control.
Id. at 178.

2011]1

THREE STORIES ABOUT NATURE

547

are many different things in the world, each having its own characteristics and its own manner in which it might be dominated. Hence, capture
may not in every case require the physical possession of an animal
carcass or a confirmed killing blow." Rather, if the pursuer "does all
that [it] is possible to do to make the animal his own, that would seem
to be sufficient" to vest a right in property." Hence, the failure to take
physical possession of a whale after delivering a mortal wound does not
undo the completeness of the act, which still qualifies as capture.2 0
Foxes, it seems, can be most apparently dominated by delivering the
mortal blow and surrendering the thing to control."' Post is not
awarded the fox as property because he failed to exercise dominion."
Real property can be dominated in the manner required by the rule of
capture. 23 Additionally, like improvements to land, for many of the
things of nature-such as in some jurisdictions, water, minerals, and
trees-ownership of the things comes with ownership of the surface
land.24 Yet the mere presence of ferae naturae on real property is not
by itself sufficient to vest a right of property against the world, except
perhaps in protecting the owner's real property boundaries against
trespass during another's take. 25 As has been repeatedly held, the
state's police power obligations-including the duty to protect a wholesome food supply-have justified the state's possession of all ferae naturae
until the right has been vested by way of capture. 26 As a result,
"[there is no private right in the citizen to take fish or game, except as
either expressly given or inferentially suffered by the state."27 When
the right to take ferae naturae is available, the rule of capture requires

18. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160-62 (D. Mass. 1881) (discussing an exception to the
possession and confirmed kill components of the rule of capture in the context of whale

hunting).
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id. at 160-61.
21.

See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 177-78.

22. Id. at 178.
23. For instance, real property can be improved, title can be transferred, title
instruments can be recorded, and physical areas can be fenced, to name a few. Depending
on the circumstances, the courts have recognized a variety of acts that can be characterized
as the type an owner would perform. See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28,
29 (N.Y. 1952) (discussing adverse possession).
24.

25 C.J.S. Crops § 5 (1966) ("The ownership of realty carries with it as an incident

thereto the prima facie presumption of the ownership of both the natural products of the
land, such as grass and trees, and the emblements, or annually sown crops.").
25. See, e.g., Cawsey v. Brickey, 144 P. 938, 940 (Wash. 1914). But see M'Conico v.
Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill.) 244 (1818) (recognizing a right to hunt on the lands of others).
26. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 40 (1908).
27.

Cawsey, 144 P. at 939.
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domination and control, even within the boundaries of privately-owned
2
"Bees are
real property.2 8 As quoted by the court in Brown v. Eckes,"
wild by nature; and so, if a swarm alight on your tree, it is not to be
considered yours, until you have hived it, any more than the birds which
build their nests there; and hence, if it be hived by another, it becomes
his property."'o In contrast, vegetation has traditionally become part
of real property and remains so even upon the sale of yet uncut
timber." For instance, courts have readily held that in the absence of
a clear intent to create an enduring right in the land itself, a sale of
standing trees may create a mere license to enter lands and remove the
timber.32
The allocation of nature to control by capture and the associated
privatization policies supported by capture might be organized under
auspices of the "Property" paradigm. Under the Property paradigm, an
award of a right in property may include security in the right to possess
and transfer the thing, the right to exclude others from it, and the right
to its economic use (in the manner preferred by the owner). Moreover,
by extending the paradigm to things in the world and making them
capturable through effort, luck, and skill, the Property paradigm had an
unmistakable influence in early American legal constructions of nature:
nature-including land, vegetation, water, minerals, and virtually all
ferae naturae-couldbe made subject to privatization by taking things out
of nature.
For purposes of this Article, two conceptual commitments are
particularly salient to Property's legal construction of nature. First,
Property is able to distinguish between valuable things and things that
are merely potentially valuable by determining whether the thing has
been reduced to ownership. This version of nature assumes that the
world is largely, if not exclusively, comprised of things that are arranged
(if at all) in a rather arbitrary and almost useless fashion. Hence, what
is the value of gold, coal, or water that remains in the ground?" It is

28. See Brown v. Eckes, 160 N.Y.S. 489, 491-92 (1916).
29. 160 N.Y.S. 489 (1916).
30. Id. at 491-92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See 25 C.J.S., supra note 24, § 6.
32. E.g., McCastle v. Scanlon, 59 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Mich. 1953) (quoting Curran v.
Gordon, 135 N.W. 264, 264 (Mich. 1912)) ("The timber until it was severed was a part of
the realty.").
33.

See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 27 (Great Books

in Philosophy ed., Prometheus Books 1986) (1690) (favoring transformed things to natural
ones, stating that "bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk
than leaves, skins or moss."); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private
Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 633-34 (1996) (discussing a Lockean approach to property
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probably about the same as that of vacant and unused land.3 4 This
idea implements the Lockean notion that the things of nature are
virtually valueless until transformed by the efforts of humans and
civilization." The Lockean scheme provides an attractive backdrop for
a transformative property doctrine because Locke's theory rests on the
premise that the transformation of nature into useful products is the
process of adding value to natural things." Locke states that "of the
products of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects
of labour."" Locke goes further, stating that "land that is left wholly
to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting,
is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it
amount to little more than nothing."" In this understanding, there is
no pre-capture or pre-transformative value attaching to nonhuman (and
even sometimes human) things." That is, things in a pre-property
state-such as the fox during the hunt-are only valued insofar as they
have potential to become property.4 0 So long as the fox eludes the
hunters, Property does not value the fox and shows little regard for its
condition, safety, or interes t s."
Things in nature do not entirely lack value, of course, because a wild
thing can become property upon capture.42 Yet by valuing only the
potential to become property, the Property paradigm also shows what is
important about natural things and how we value them. In Property's

rights).
34. Although market value is not a necessary and sufficient condition for things to
become property, it often seems so. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414
(1922) ("What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit."); Tennessee ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'1 Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ("In its broadest sense, property includes all rights that have value.").
35.

See LOCKE, supra note 33, at 26-31.

36. Id. at 19-20.
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 27.
39.

See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993) (discussing
the "transformative economy" in which property rights arise from transforming nature into
a useful state).
40. See id.
41. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES, L. REV. 1269, 1277

(1993) ("If the land is injured in a way that the market does not value, the injury is
irrelevant."). After capture, Property shows even less interest in the needs of the fox (as
a fox). Under the Property scheme, a captured fox has become valuable by the hunter's
ability to extend his boundaries of ownership in a way that includes the fox, now
transformed by the domination of the hunter. After capture, Property values the fox as the
hunter's property.
42. See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178-79.
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description of nature, rights might be acquired in "as much as [man]
could use,"' and as such, property rules can be developed in ignorance
of, or at least in the absence of understanding of, natural processes. The
market may be disinterested in such things," suggesting that there is
no capture-based incentive to investigate and learn more about such precapture things except where necessary to capture resources more
effectively and efficiently. Yet lack of understanding of nature was not
an impediment to allocation of property rights; rules were needed to
protect expectations of those people intending to take and those actually
taking things in the world. Therefore, wetlands can be made more
productive when we understand them as mosquito-infested bogs rather
than when we investigate their character, location, or function.
Likewise, as Samuel Weil pointed out, law allocated rights to take
groundwater in "ignorance or disregard" of the natural processes at
work." The mysteries of subsurface water movement were embraced
in the allocation of groundwater rights, notwithstanding calls for the
convergence of the laws of natural forces and the laws of humans.4 6
Due to the challenges of knowing what occurred underground, it was
decided that "an attempt to administer any set of legal rules . . . to

[groundwater] would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would be,
therefore, practically impossible.'
Once domination is complete and a property right attaches to the
thing, the thing is subjected to the will and fancy of the dominator; the
rule of capture "makes the actions of conquest and dispossession proper:
property in the captor."' The thing that was potentially property and
unowned has now become property-a thing to which the claim "this is
mine" applies to the exclusion of all others. Hence, it is the Property
process that creates value by transforming the chaos and the waste of
nature into order. As such, once things in nature are captured and
converted to property, the Property paradigm insists that law exert its
influence to protect legitimate claims.

43.

LOCKE, supra note 33, at 29.

44. See James P. Karp, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is an Ecological Conscience Evolving
in Land Development Law?, 19 ENVTL. L. 737, 742 (1989) ("The main shortcoming of
decision making based solely on economics is that many members of the biotic community
have no known economic value.").
45. Samuel C. Weil, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL.
L. REv. 358, 369 (1929).
46. See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled on other grounds
by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ohio 1984).

47. Id.
48. Lea VanderVelde, The Role of Captives and the Rule of Capture, 35 ENVTL. L. 649,
655 (2005).
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Property's tool for this project-one that ensures the value in property
is enjoyed by the capturer-is found in the idea of boundaries. By
enforcing clearly demarcated boundaries, law can identify the limits of
the property claim ("this is mine") and protect property against invasion
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
by another."9
expresses the same sentiment:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.so
Real property boundaries, whether delineated by a fence, on a plat map,
or even by metes and bounds in a deed, enable the owner to exclude
others and verify the right to possess. Boundaries further enable
markets in things, providing exacting information about the thing's
value in an exchange.
Of course, boundaries also play a role in the retention of property in
natural things.5 ' Assuming that it is in the nature of ferae naturae to
be wild, the proprietor must also continue to exercise such control over
the things left alive so as to prevent the property from escaping and
reentering the realm of mere pre-property things. 52 Hence, courts have

49. See Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water's Edge: Limits to"Ownership"ofAquatic
Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE?, supra note 6, at

201, 206-07 ("Anglo-American property law . . . relies heavily on the notion of fixed
boundaries and stability of title, without which landowners could not have the requisite
certainty of return necessary to invest labor and capital.").
50. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 (John L.
Wendell ed., Harper & Bros. Publishers 1858) (1765-1769).
51. While the things of nature may become property by capture, all property is subject
to loss by abandonment, and with regards to the ferae naturae, this rule has special
applicability. As noted by Blackstone, "[Ilf the pheasants escape from the mew, or the
fishes from the trunk, and are seen wandering at large in their proper element, they
become ferae naturaeagain, and are free and open to the first occupant that has ability to
seize them." BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 392.
52. BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 391. There has been some conflict in authority on
whether an escape actually severs the thing as property when the escaped animals caused
damages or trespassed on another's property. The common law is said to have been
imbued with the rule that at least domesticated animals "are required to be restrained by
the owner from running at large." Evans v. McLain, 175 S.W. 294, 294 (Mo. Ct. App.
1915). In addition, because "[tlhe liability of the owner or keeper of an animal of any
description, for an injury committed by such animal, is founded upon negligence," the
owner of a known dangerous "wild beast" is held to a high standard of care. Scribner v.
Kelley, 38 Barb. 14, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862); see also Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 55
N.E.2d 724, 728 (Ohio 1944). In Taylor the court stated that
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ruled that enclosures of land to contain ferae naturae are sufficient, and
often necessary, to establish boundaries and retain the level of control
prerequisite to retaining a vested right in the animals." In the case
of fish, an Ohio court stated,
When (the capturer] has confined them within his own private
inclosure, where he may subject them to his own use at his pleasure,
and maintains reasonable precautions to prevent escape, they are so
impressed with his proprietorship that a felonious taking of them from
his inclosure, whether trap, care, park, net, or whatever it may be, will
be larceny.s
The rules for maintaining sufficient control will necessarily vary in
accordance with some combined analysis of the nature of the thing and
the practical impossibilities associated with preserving the value of title
per industriam. Therefore, in rejecting an action in trespass against the
owner of chickens, a Missouri court declined to follow the common law
obligation of the chickens' owners to fence them in, ruling instead that
the obligation rested on property owners to fence animals out." In the
case of bees, capture requires hiving the swarm; yet because the swarm
might escape of their own accord or by enticement of another "by
striking upon the brass," the claimant "has the right to reclaim and
repossess them so far as he can see them and follow them; otherwise, the
swarm belongs to the owner of the land upon which they affix themselves.""
Given the operation of the Property value scheme, it should not be
surprising that the purpose of boundaries is largely understood to
protect the whims of individuals and their preferences concerning the
uses to which private property should be put. Under the Property
description of nature, environmental quality, species diversity, species
themselves, and other environmental elements are relegated to a role
that preferences may play." Any other means of valuing property, it

[a] person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and if he
does not confine it he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Dieterich v. Fargo, 87 N.E. 518, 520 (N.Y. 1909) (recognizing the property
right in deer that had been enclosed and bred in captivity).
54. State v. Shaw, 65 N.E. 875, 876 (Ohio 1902).
55. Evans, 175 S.W. at 295-96.
56. Eckes, 160 N.Y.S. at 491-92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Garrett Hardin has been the leading proponent of Property as a means of
environmental protection. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in GLOBAL
POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A READER 364 (Richard W. Mansuach & Edward Rhodes
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is suggested, is fraught with traps, as "Itihere is something basic-whether its origins are instinctual or cultural-in the notion of 'mine' that
attaches to physical possessions and that sees the power of others over
those possessions as inappropriate interference to be vigorously
resisted.""
Based on the central location of boundaries to Property and the
manner in which Property vests owners with the discretion over the
question of how to value natural things, it should also be no surprise
that environmental protection was a difficult concept to integrate into
the Property scheme. 9 The idea of nature as transformable, improvable, and capturable supported a drive to dominate as much land as
could be used. In A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold pointed out
that people have found ways to use land when the market supports it:
"We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us."o
Mining claims and water diversions in the West rested their property
claims on the Lockean notion of dessert in property: "[H]e who first
connected his labor with the property . . . in natural justice acquired a
better right to its use and enjoyment than others who had not given
such labor."' As such, some natural features of land, particularly
wetlands and features that presented similar development challenges,

eds., 4th ed. 2009). In The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin suggests that the boundaries
themselves will encourage environmental conservation. See id. at 365. Boundaries help
to distinguish between capturable things and captured things: once understood as property,
the things of the world are subject to the concerns of self-interest. Self-interest in owned
resources, combined with the willingness of others to pay for use and consumption of those
owned resources, creates an incentive to sustain exploitation over time. See id.
It is widely but by no means universally thought that the boundedness aspect of Property
is inadequate for purposes of protecting the natural environment. Criticisms are typically
focused on the idea of allocating every inch of the world to private control: because the
market answer measures value only in the market, there is no room left for value in
nature. Because market-based value ends at property boundaries, the rationality of
conservation is not dependable. At the least, the incentive to conserve, which may be
supported under Property, was less persuasive without the convergence of the property
owner's perceived shortage in the resource at issue and a satisfactory demand-present or
future-for the resource. In the absence of either of these conditions, Property provides no
basis for environmental protection and lacks a mechanism to impose value on resources as
other than a commodity. In any event, the location of property boundaries seldom
corresponds to natural processes.
58. Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1297 (2009).
59. See N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: PublicRegulation of Water Quality,
52 IOwA L. REV. 186, 195-201 (1966) (arguing that the common law was incapable of
adequately protecting environmental concerns).
60. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC x (1966).
61. Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 446 (Nev. 1885).
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have had an understandably troubled history under the Property
understanding of nature." Although land in an unsanitary condition
due to natural causes was not necessarily a nuisance at common law,"
in many cases, wetlands were used for garbage disposal and thus turned
into nuisances." Likewise, some large bodies of water served as mere
receptacles for solid and hazardous wastes.s Even in natural wetlands, the eradication of swamps was recognized as a duty of the state6 6
and could be done at the expense of the public, as draining such lands
was considered to be for the "common benefit." In other cases, states
burdened property owners with the obligation of filling wetlands and
marshes that had become stagnant and, as such, a nuisance." As the
Supreme Court of the United States stated in its infamous understanding of swamps,

62. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON
WETLANDS, VOL. II, A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 33 (Mar. 1994). As reported by the United States Secretary of the
Interior,
The Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that of the 221 million acres of wetlands
which existed in the coterminous United States at the time of the Nation's
settlement, only 104 million acres (47%) remained in 1985. Wetlands constitute
only about five percent of the surface area of the lower 48 States. Between the
mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, annual wetland losses averaged 458,000 acres, an
area about half the size of Rhode Island. Between the mid-1970s and the mid1980s, this loss rate was reduced to about 290,000 acres per year.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Brown v. Campbell, 21 Haw. 314, 321 (1912).
64. See, e.g., Mansfield v. Atl. Chem. Co., 129 N.E. 601, 602 (Mass. 1921); Adams v.
Clover Hill Farms, 167 P. 1015, 1016 (Or. 1917); Bales v. City of Tacoma, 20 P.2d 860, 86263 (Wash. 1933).
65. See, e.g., Joe G. Moore Jr., Foreword to FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 905R68003, LAKE ERIE REPORT: A PLAN FOR

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (1968). Joe G. Moore, Commissioner of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA), once noted, "Man is destroying Lake Erie.
Although the accelerating destruction process has been inadvertent, it is as positive as if
he had put all his energies into devising and implementing the means. After two
generations the process has gained a momentum which now requires a monumental effort
to retard." Id. He also noted that although oil spills are common in harbors, in the Lake
Erie basin some industrial facilities were "dischargling] oil intentionally and continuously,"
a circumstance that was recognized to be "not only disgraceful" but also a major health and
wildlife hazard. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, 905R68003, LAKE ERIE REPORT: A PLAN FOR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 58

(1968).
66. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 635-36 (1900).
67. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 549-50 (1866).
68. See, e.g., Campbell, 21 Haw. at 324.
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We think that the trial court might well take judicial notice that the
public health is deeply concerned in the reclamation of swamp and
overflowed lands. If there is any fact which may be supposed to be
known by everybody, and therefore by courts, it is that swamps and
stagnant waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and
that the police power is never more legitimately exercised than in
removing such nuisances.'
The Court's disposition in Leovy v. United States reflects a paradigm
under which the natural state is not the valuable state of land, the state
of nature can be improved, and nature in some cases is itself noxious.
Given the foregoing, the doctrine raising the most significant
conceptual challenge for Property's boundary scheme is nuisance. Under
the doctrine of public nuisance, public welfare interests can be protected
by restricting the rights of private property owners to use their property
(or alternatively, of private parties from making particular uses of
common lands) in ways that interfere with the public welfare.o Public
nuisances may be less of a concern to the Property paradigm to those
who recognize the historic limitations in right to land use as contingent
upon systemic needs in a property system.'
Private nuisance is
problematic for the Property approach, however, because it suggests that
property boundaries are not physically absolute as between private
competitors for space. Although a cause of action in nuisance is
premised on an injury felt on the plaintiff's property, the cause and the
remedy for nuisance involve an analysis of the reasonableness of
activities on another owner's property. 72 Arguably, nuisance does not

69.

Leovy, 177 U.S. at 636.

70. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051(1992); Am. Steel
& Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers & Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1&3, 90 F. 608, 612, 614 (N.D.
Ohio 1898) ("It is just as much a nuisance to block up the street and impair the right by
the continual presence of bodies . .. who obstruct the ingress and egress, as it would be to
build barricades and embankments in the street.").
71. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Keith H. Hirokawa, Property Pieces in
Compensation Statutes: Law's Eulogy for Oregon's Measure 37, 38 ENVTL. L. 1111, 1138
(2008).
72. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Col., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953). In Morgan the
North Carolina Supreme Court explained that
[tihe confusion on this score vanishes in large part, however, when proper heed
is paid to the sound propositions that private nuisance is a field of tort liability
rather than a single type of tortious conduct; that the feature which gives unity
to this field of tort liability is the interest invaded, namely, the interest in the use
and enjoyment of land; that any substantial nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming
conduct is a private nuisance; that the invasion which subjects a person to liability
for private nuisance may be either intentional or unintentional; that a person is

556

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

respect property boundaries. Nuisance allows a party to follow the
injury beyond property boundaries to its source, and in this sense vests
rights on another's property. Of course, we might not think of nuisance
in this way primarily because nuisance operates only on property use
and not on possession: where the impact of a land use transcends
boundaries and interferes with another's enjoyment of her own property,
the intruding land use is not protected by a right in property."
Even if nuisance law is conceptually difficult to reconcile with property
boundaries, it nonetheless follows under the Property scheme that a
takings claim under the Fifth Amendment74 is questionable when
leveled against a regulation of property use. It is perfectly understandable that under the Property approach, a physical invasion by the
government for public use is deemed an invasion of constitutionally
protected rights. Whether the invasion is intended for physical public
use,7 5 causes nuisance-like impacts above private property," or
requires the property owner to allow access,77 a taking is founded on a
public invasion of private boundaries and the resulting loss of the right
to exclude. However, that a mere regulation of property is not considered such a violation" is a circumstance that seems more analytically
significant than coincidental under the Property paradigm. Because
land owners enjoy a reciprocal advantage offered by police power
regulations "applie[d] over a broad cross section," because property use
regulations do not affect the title to property, and because a regulation
does not physically invade property boundaries, mere regulations of
property leave property boundaries intact." Accordingly, under the

subject to liability for an intentional invasion when his conduct is unreasonable
under the circumstances of the particular case.
Id.
73. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987)
("[Slince no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to
enjoin the nuisance-like activity.").
74. U.S. CONST. amend V.
75. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
76. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
77. E.g., Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
78. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915).
79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978). Where a
"prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land [itl thereby 'secure[s] an average
reciprocity of advantage.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Coal, 260 U.S.
at 415). The reasoning of the "average reciprocity" was not intended to apply to regulations
that target specific property owners for provisions of public benefits. See Pa. Coal, 260
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Property paradigm, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not
restrain the mere regulation of property use due to the "substantial
authority upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate
restrictions upon an owner's use of his property."o Hence, in Mugler
v. Kansas,8 ' the Court rejected a takings theory in a challenge to
regulations prohibiting the manufacture of liquor, even when the
regulations would clearly diminish the value of the plaintiff's existing
facility.82 The Court in Mugler noted that a mere limitation on the use
of land generally falls short of an unconstitutional intrusion." Instead,
such regulations are intended to protect property from being used to a
noxious result or impact."
The Property paradigm assumes that natural things are reducible to
control by domination, an act that is rewarded in the allocation of a
right to property. Property casts natural things as things that must be
dominated and transformed to be useful, valuable, and valued. This
scheme was protected and enforced by physical boundaries through
which law could identify and protect captured property. Yet both the
privatization of nature by boundaries and the encouragement of capture
by transformation were ultimately vulnerable.

U.S. at 415. Distinguishing between these restrictions may require courts to consider the
claims "upon the particular facts" when "[tlhe general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." Id. at 413, 415. However, the Court was clear that a regulation has not gone too
far by "securling] an average reciprocity of advantage" to all interested owners. Id. at 415.
"While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions," reasoned the Court, "we, in
turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others." Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491.
80. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (emphasis omitted); see also Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410-11
(upholding prohibition of brickyard in residential area); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53, 86 (1851) (distinguishing eminent domain from regulatory restrictions on
grounds that property use limitations are enforced "not because the public have occasion
to make the like use, or to make any use of the property, or to take any benefit or profit
to themselves from it; but because it would be a noxious use, contrary to the maxim, sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non [laedus)").

81. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
82. Id. at 664.
83. Id. at 668-69.
84. Id. at 669.
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value
becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from
depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an
innocent owner.
Id.

558

III.

A.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

THE ENVIRONMENT AS BOUNDED NATURE: VALUING NONHUMAN
THINGS, ONE THING AT A TIME

In the Matter of Pierson v. Post
At this point in time, our insistence that public laws
serve the public welfare has converged with our understanding of the importance in protecting the natural
environment. In response to a history of mistreatment and
misunderstanding of the environment, the legislature has
enacted a host of regulatory schemes to curtail pollution of
the air, water, and land; to preserve areas of special
natural interest; and to save endangered species that lie
on the brink of extinction. This shift in policy is based in
part on human health needs and in part on the values
inhering in nature, and by all accounts it is changing the
way that business is done in our state. Nevertheless, and
in all honesty, we stand amazed and a touch appalled at
how many laws may have been violated in this case, not as
much because of Pierson's and Post's lack of responsibility
or fidelity to law (which is undoubtedly troubling) but
because of the manner in which Mr. Post's actions are
regulated. The law now contains separate volumes on
each of many aspects of nature, including water use and
water quality; drinking water quality; air emissions; toxic
substances; releases of hazardous materials; the generation, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes;
wildlife regulations (some of them on a species-by-species
basis); timber and grazing practices; mining practices;
roadless areas; wetlands (freshwater and coastal); and
power generation, to name only a few. Law has even
accommodated the regulation of rainwater.
Pierson and Post long for the days when fox hunting
remained a raucous and effete affair, and both reminisce
by asserting that this fox is rather ordinary, neither
threatened nor endangered, and is generally considered to
be something of a pest. They each contend-on the relative
merits of their own claim, of course-that they have
benefitted the public by removing such a mischievous
creature. As to these arguments, we find it difficult to
object because there seems to be nothing special about this
menace, save that it remains a menace and that the
legislature has not seen fit to imbue it with any special
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value. Yet the court is also reminded of a favorite children's novel: in the opening pages, Zuckerman intended to
put the axe to the runt of the litter because, as he put it,
he knew best what to do with such things; his daughter
cried, "[Ilt's unfair."" The pig lived (at least before the
pig met the spider) because we have passed the time when
the things of nature are always subject to what is most
convenient for us (such as in killing the runt to save the
cost of raising a less valuable pig).
That said, we note that nobody-government,
nonprofit, or individual-has been able to identify the
inherent value of this fox or has been willing to speak on
its behalf. On this issue, we find it significant that nobody
seemed aware of this fox's existence, and certainly nobody
had captured it by photograph or otherwise celebrated its
natural liberty. Thus, nobody that we can think of has
standing to object to the taking of this fox, except perhaps
the parties themselves. In any event, any yet unvoiced
preferences in favor of the fox have effectively been
waived.
Of course, while this waiver may end the dispute for
Pierson, Post has murkier waters to navigate before
clearing the tide. The array of laws violated is, as noted,
impressive. The federal government has adopted laws and
regulations that protect, among other things, the forests of
this region from clearcutting, the fish and people from
degradation of the nation's surface waters, and various
The state
animals and insects from extermination.
legislature has likewise adopted laws that require consideration of environmental values before denying the public
of its preference for nature and natural areas. Even the
local government has adopted laws that require Mr. Post
to submit his plans to scientific and engineering review
when his plans dramatically transform these natural
things.
The foregoing should be a sufficient basis to reject
Post's argument that Pierson and Post should share
equally in any potential liability for violations of the
applicable environmental laws. According to Post, because
the parties shared the intent to take the fox, they should

85. E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE'S WEB 1-3 (1952).
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be equally liable for the adverse impacts caused by the
taking. The problem with Post's argument is that the laws
dealing with nature are compartmentalized. Each environmental amenity has its own regulatory scheme, and there
is very little crossover between the various schemes. For
example, Pierson's blow to the fox does not, but Post's
relocation of the stream does, trigger the "dredge and fill"
regulations of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Had Post applied for and been granted permits for
these activities (a scenario about which we are highly
skeptical), Post's action might only have been annoying
and contrary to the stated public preferences for leaving
clean water, clean air, clean land, and beautiful scenery
intact. Mr. Post's claim fails not only because he failed to
comply with the regulatory requirements governing his
actions but also because his actions ultimately deprived
the public of the value of lands in their natural state, a
value for unused land that the legislature has found to be
within the scope of the public's interests.
Signed, The Court
B.

Finding Value in Pre-PropertyThings
In 1972 the Supreme Court rejected the Sierra Club's claim that it had
standing to challenge the federal approval of a proposed ski resort and
recreation area in a "quasi-wilderness area largely uncluttered by the
products of civilization.",6 The Court refused to alter the requirement
that a petitioner, even if suing on behalf of nature, meet the basic
elements of standing.8 7 The Court did not modify the rule that even a
sincere care for the interests and needs of others (especially nonhuman
others) could not by itself be sufficient to seek redress in courts.'

86. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 728, 741 (1972).
87. Id. at 739-40.
88. Id. However, nonhuman things can neither speak for their interests nor possess
cognizable interests under Article III of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONsT.
art. III. The argument in favor of a broad reading of standing at the time was delivered
in Justice Douglas's dissent, in which he argued that the standing inquiry
would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal
courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or
invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.
SierraClub, 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This approach was also reflected in
Christopher Stone's answer to the question of whether trees should have standing to sue
on their own behalf. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward
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Moreover, consistent with the notion of boundaries that underlies the
Property paradigm, the Court ruled that claims to have visited similar
places are inadequate, and similarly, the Court rejected "almost" and
"maybe" future uses of threatened natural places under the standing
inquiry's requirement that the party demonstrate an actual injury. 9
Nevertheless, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court diverged from the
Property paradigm by determining that the Court's authority could be
invoked to resolve a controversy over threats to a nonhuman, environmental value: a party interested in protecting nature could declare a
specific use of the specific natural thing (thatEnvironment over there) in
a manner that qualifies her interests in judicial controversies." The
Court recognized that natural things themselves had value and
construed such value in a way that is referred to here as the "Environment."'
The shift represented in Sierra Club was dramatic.9 2 Statutes
facilitating the domination of nature and development of the West,
referred to by Charles Wilkinson as "the lords of yesterday," adopted
capture-type schemes, and the vast natural resources of the West were
subordinated to the civilization of the wild." As historian John Steele
Gordon states,

Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 464-73 (1972).

The Court's

response to Stone's request was a variation of what is often referred to as the sameness
argument: the system was set up to service humans and human interests, so only those
entities that share those interests and can communicate them as such (in other words, only
entities that have sameness with the human interests protected under law) can seek
redress. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736-40. It is the sameness argument that keeps
trees out of court, and in all likelihood, it is the sameness approach to value in nature that
keeps this understanding of nature from offering a legal construction of nature that
protects nonuse values. This understanding is subject to and occasionally dependent upon
the boundaries of property to have legal existence.
89. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992).
90. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40.
91. See id. at 734-35.
92. Hence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently noted that
[wihile the owner of land might once have been permitted to mine his land
without regard to the effect that it had on public streams, as evidenced by the
spoilage of "11,000 miles of streams" in this country, that expectation is, and has
been for some time, no longer reasonable.
Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 772 (Pa. 2002) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,279
(1981)). In such a case, "[njo such term as a right of property" applies to the claim. Pa. R.
Co v. Sagamore Coal Co., 126 A. 386, 391 (Pa. 1924).
93.

See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN xiii, 17 (1992).
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So rapid an alteration of the landscape could only have a severe impact
on the ecosystem as a whole. The loss of so much forest caused runoff
to increase sharply, eroding the land and burdening the waters with
silt, destroying more wetlands. Many animals' habitats disappeared.
And because the ancient biblical notion that humans had dominion
over the earth still held, others vanished entirely
In the meantime, rivers burned," forests disappeared, and animals and
insects that were once believed to be disposable disappeared on a scale
that had been inconceivable."
As the West became less wild from early pioneering efforts, and as
humans began to realize the gravity of irreversible impacts on nature,
the privatization model of resource allocation began to lose its luster. By
encouraging domination over lands and resources, the rule of capture
arguably allowed too much privatization, too much individualism, and
too much transformation. Although they may have been unwilling to
revoke capture as legal doctrine, state and federal governments were
willing to exercise their authority in rethinking the character of those
things subject to privatization through capture."
Governmental
entities began to withdraw public property from the commons and
restrict the privatization of such lands."
In addition, Property

94. John Steele Gordon, The American Environment: The Big Picture is More
Heartening than All the Little Ones, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1993, at 31, 40.
95. Jonathon H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 89, 95 (2002). The 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga

River is frequently attributed as the birthplace of modern environmental law. Id. at 94.
96. See Gordon, supra note 94, at 36, 40, 44.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1915) (discussing
the Secretary of Interior's approval of a recommendation to suspend private claims to oil
lands in California).
98. See id. In Midwest Oil Co., the Court was called upon to resolve a challenge to the
executive branch's authority to withdraw public lands from "all forms of location,
settlement, selection, filing, entry, or disposal under the mineral or nonmineral public-land
laws." Id. at 467. This act, made by presidential proclamation, was challenged by private
parties that had successfully explored public lands for oil deposits and begun extracting oil
from public lands. Id. at 467-69. The challenge, in effect, sounded in takings. See id. at
468. The Court rejected the challenge, concluding that the resource had never been
capturable and, therefore, no private injury could have resulted:
But when it appeared that the public interest would be served by withdrawing or
reserving parts of the public domain, nothing was more natural than to retain
what the government already owned. And in making such orders, which were
thus useful to the public, no private interest was injured. For, prior to the
initiation of some right given by law, the citizen had no enforceable interest in the
public statute, and no private right in land which was the property of the people.
Id. at 471. Where the liberty and individual interests embodied in the rule of capture need
to give way to public needs, government serves the public by effectively withdrawing the
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accommodated preconditions to capture in the form of permitting
programs. This was not, of course, the first time that the state regulated
capture, but the idea that restrictions on capture could be based on an
analysis of environmental impacts was a bit novel."
While some commentators have argued that environmental law
evolved through a gradual and incremental shift in political consciousness,100 most have focused on how immediately and dramatically
For
environmental law diverged from the Property paradigm."o'
purposes of this Article, the difference is merely one of degree. Whether
modern environmental law appeared in a flash or a growing rumble, the
focus here is on the transition away from nature as things effected
dramatic shifts in the way that law understood and treated the
environment. Where wild or natural areas were identified, they were
severed (both physically and conceptually) from the transformative urges
of privatization in favor of a trend toward preserving aesthetic, scientific,

resource from the possibility of capture. Id.
The authority of governmental agencies to refine and modify the capture of natural
resources has been repeatedly upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516
(1982). In Texaco the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Indiana's Dormant Mineral
Interests Act, 1971, Ind. Acts 1970, §1, repealed by 2002 Ind. Acts 187, §8 (codified at IND.
CODE § 32-23-10-2 (2002)), which automatically reverted severed mineral interests that
went unused for a period of twenty years or more. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 516. Although such
mineral interests had not previously been subject to durational requirements, the Court
upheld the act, stating that "just as a State may create a property interest that is entitled
to constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention
of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present
intention to retain the interest." Id. at 526. Soon after, in United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84 (1985), the Court approved the forfeiture provisions of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2006), which triggered the
forfeiture of unpatented mining claims for failure to comply with annual filing requirements. Locke, 471 U.S. at 88-89. The Court in Locke refined the rule, noting that "[elven
with respect to vested property rights, a legislature generally has the power to impose new
regulatory constraints on the way in which those rights are used, or to condition their
continued retention on performance of certain affirmative duties." Id. at 104.
99. Although the analysis here suggests a chronology for the alternative paradigms
addressed in the Article, it is not the intention to argue that any particular date or law
affected a revolutionary shift.
100. See generally KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945-1970 (2009) (arguing that the modern environmental law
regime is the product of incremental changes).
101. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Scholarship and the Harvard
Difference, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 341-42 (1999) ("Before 1970, environmental
protection and pollution were not distinct categories of legal scholarship. Environmental
law did not emerge as a distinct category of legal scholarship until approximately 1973.").
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and ecological values, as well as something of the sublime.'02 Water
bodies and wetlands were assessed for uses other than waste disposForest-harvesting practices attempted to reconcile the ideas of
al.'
Liability schemes led to large-scale
consumption and regrowth.10
remediation of hazardous waste sites."' Laws even identified species
on the brink of extinction and restrained acts that would result in the
decline of endangered and threatened species.'c These laws illustrate
serious consideration for the notion that the dangers of resource
depletion and human exposure to toxins should play a significant role in
identifying how nature should be treated."o0
Notably, in the shift to understanding nature as the Environment, the
legal construction of nature incorporated, instead of abdicated, the
reliance on a physical presence to confirm values of nature in land. In
particular, courts have imposed on the Environment an ascertainability
element, requiring agencies to identify as clearly as possible a particular

102. For a nonexhaustive list of the various characterizations of this new intersection
between law and environmental value over the last fifteen years, see Holly Doremus, The
Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 11 (2000); Keith H. Hirokawa, Some PragmaticObservationsAbout Radical Critique
in Environmental Law, 21 STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 225 (2002); Peter M. Manus, Natural
Resource Damages From Rachel Carson's Perspective: A Rite of Spring in American
Environmentalism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1996); Marc R. Poirier, Property,
Environment, Community, 12 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 43 (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER,
ECOPRAGMATISM (1999); RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).

103. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
104. Cf. LEOPOLD, supra note 60. Leopold observed that humans have invented
constructive tools or at least have invented constructive uses for some tools. Id. at 67-68.
However, "when the axe was invented, Iman) became a taker: he could chop Itrees] down.
Whoever owns land has thus assumed, whether he knows it or not, the divine functions of
creating and destroying plants." Id. at 67.
105. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. H§ 9601-9628 (2006).
106. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
107. The laws of the Environment embraced a different understanding of the things in
nature: these laws were intended to protect values in land that are foreign to the
fundamentals of the Property paradigm. Given the extent of this transition in the way that
we understood nature-arguably, a veritable paradigm shift in our private and personal
understandings of the world-it could seem surprising that law was able to adapt. Indeed,
in contrast to the primacy of personal preferences protected in the Property scheme, the
Environment imposed nonproperty and nontransformative values on land and other objects
of property. Law found a way to make the shift, evidenced by the volumes of laborious
literature by legal scholars intent to identify unifying threads or common grounds that run
through each of the statutes that tie our legal treatment of nature to the values that we
express in nature. The transition from Property has been no small feat, and it in large
part consisted of overlaying property boundaries with notions of nature as valuable preproperty things.
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aspect of nature that is subject to regulation. For instance, the decision
in Sierra Club showed that parties can only acquire standing in such
cases if they are able to demonstrate a convergence of their physical
selves with a particular place or thing by ultimately penetrating the
Similarly, in United States v.
boundaries of the Environment.'o
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,'o although "the Corps' ecological
judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent
wetlands" is not appropriate for searching judicial scrutiny, the Court
insisted that "the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which
water ends and land begins."1 o Later, in Rapanos v. United
States,"' Justice Scalia's plurality opinion concluded that wetland
jurisdiction would extend only to a wetland that is adjacent to, and
continuously connected through surface water to, "a relatively permanent body of water connected to . . . navigable waters."" 2 Justice
Scalia's opinion, which largely relies on commonplace definitions of the
jurisdictional term "waters,"" emphasizes the manner in which the
Environment was identified by associating the values of the Environment with a physical, structural presence.
Law in this approach has tended to operate with three primary
results, each illustrating a different aspect of the boundedness of the
Environment. First, because the emerging paradigm required treatment
of the environment as a thing independent of (and perhaps irrelevant to)
property ownership, the Environment could be withdrawn from the
realm of capturable things and segregated from Property's conception of

108. See 405 U.S. at 735 ("Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state
that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way
that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents."). Justice
Kennedy explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), that

[wihile it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged
action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete
and personal way. This requirement is not just an empty formality. It preserves
the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that the
legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of
a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.
Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
110. Id. at 132-34.
111. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
112. Id. at 742.
113. Id. at 739.
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value. Withdrawal of land from the public domain for protection of
nature generated some competition with notions of pre-property things
and the not-yet-properties. This competition became more complex
where the Environment was found on private lands. Identification of
environmental values in a way that conflicts with the private values of
land ownership effectively severed the construct of Property from the
values of nature.
The systemic advantage of this approach was that it allowed the
values of the Environment to be recognized outside of the commons and
even on previously captured private property. Take, for instance, the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),"' which illustrates a far-reaching
example of valuing natural things for nonproperty value."' Indeed,
the ESA recognizes the value of a species's continued existence, and
taken as a whole, the ESA reflects a formal policy of recognizing the
importance of biodiversity."' The value of identifying biodiversity as
a nonuse value is not intended to imply that biodiversity is not useful to
humans; to the contrary, as Joseph Sax notes, "Most species have no
economic value to those who own the lands that are their habitat,
though they may be of extraordinary value for research that ultimately
Moregenerates important scientific and technological advances.""
over, the goals of species biodiversity-including the value added by the
very existence of endangered or threatened species-simply do not follow
property boundaries and are "not dependent on whether its habitat
straddles a state line.""' Therefore, the ESA serves as the measure

114.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.

115. See id. Wildlife regulation has traditionally occurred at the state level from a
property perspective, and states generally regulated wildlife in a manner that facilitated
and encouraged the capture of wild animals. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
522 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 324-25 (1979). See generally
Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier Weapon in the Fight Against
Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36-39 (1995). Over time, the
ability of states to regulate wildlife populations through simple capture rules began to
unravel as the federal government asserted authority to remove wildlife from the commons.
Through statutes such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2006), the
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2006), the Lacey Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 41-47 (2006), the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2006), and
a bevy of other statutes, the federal government intercepted the hunt and withdrew certain
animals from state control. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (upholding
Congressional power to withdraw wild horses and burros from state and private control).
116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a); see also Ala.-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477
F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Biodiversity's value is not ethereal; its preservation
produces economic gain in even the most narrow sense.").
117. Joseph L. Sax, The Unfinished Agenda of Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS W.Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2008).
118. Ala.-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1275.
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of the distance that environmental law has come from the simple
domination basis of rights. When the ESA applies, the federal government withdraws particular species of ferae naturae from the realm of
capturable things 19 and even protects such species from harm.'2 0
The majority in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon"' punctuated the point that the protection of biodiversity does not suffer a capture relationship to property.'

119. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (determining whether a species qualifies for protection under
the act).
120. See id. § 1533(bX2), (d) (allowing for the Secretary of the Interior to designate
critical habitats and take other measures to protect endangered and threatened species).
One of the more dramatic divergences of the ESA from the capture description of property
comes in the manner that the ESA conceives of "injury" and "harm" to nonhuman entities.
Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19), a "take" of a listed species includes "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in such
conduct." The Fish and Wildlife Service defines the term "harm" to mean "an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation [that] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2009).
121. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
122. See id. at 704. In Babbitt the dissent advocated a restrictive definition of a "take"
of a listed species as a concept of property acquisition tied to notions of physical domination
over the ferae naturae. Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court
affirmed an understanding of species protection that reflects on keeping endangered species
alive, defining the term "harm" to include habitat modification and other actions that
injure a species' ability to find shelter and breed. Id. at 707-08 (majority opinion). The
majority specifically rejected the capture approach and the notion that wildlife is akin to
"some creature" despite the contention that capture provided an "'established meaning' of
'take' in the sense of a 'wildlife take,' a meaning respondents argue extends only to 'the
effort to exercise dominion over some creature.'" Id. at 697 n.10. This characterization,
which becomes important in the following section on ecosystem services, illustrates how
problematic it might be to identify any particular point in time at which any one paradigm
might be said to dominate this field of law.
In large part, this problem has resulted from the way in which we have engaged nature
in the Environment as a haphazard collection of independent things. Take, for example,
the array of relatively clearly delineated categories of water and resulting independent
regulatory schemes, including the following: surface stormwater, percolating stormwater,
navigable surface waters, nonnavigable waters, isolated wetlands, connected wetlands,
groundwater, subsurface streams, drinking water, aquatic habitat, return flows, saved
water, and the various water quality classifications under the CWA's water quality scheme.
See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. For the most part, these classifications deal with
how the particular water sources or flows affect property values, influence capture rules,
or threaten human health. The categories do not relate so sharply to ecosystem
functionality in the sense that they are not intended to identify the role such source or flow
plays in ecosystem health or the production of ecosystem goods and services. Moreover,
as illustrated in the role of critical habitat mapping in implementing environmental values,
the battles over classifying the species unit subject to protection under the ESA, the
rejection of using habitat triggers to indicate species decline, and the emphasis on
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The second result of the shift toward the Environment's understanding
of nature relates to the role of boundaries in identifying the Environment. Treating things in nature as valuable in themselves (without
transformation) may have been a significant blow to the economic
potential attributed to natural things, particularly as that sense of value
is manifested in law. However, incorporation of boundaries allowed
Property and the Environment to coexist in the scheme. Not all natural
things qualified as part of the Environment, of course, so bounding the
Environment allowed law to identify environmental priorities while
helping to identify what was not property (and thus not captured or
subject to capture).
As an example, consider the manner in which nature is identified for
protection under the Wilderness Act of 1964.123 Through the Wilderness Act, Congress intended to assure that the ever-increasing human
population and expanding ecological footprint would "not occupy and
modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no
lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural
condition." 12 4 The Wilderness Act was specifically aimed at curtailing
the private capture and domination of "wild areas" as a means of
preventing the permanent transformation of an otherwise unrenewable
resource.125 The Wilderness Act was not novel for the reason that
federal authority was exercised to curtail the privatization of common
resources.126 Rather, what was novel about the Wilderness Act was
that its premise for protecting wilderness was the value of wilderness

producing a dead member of the listed species as the ultimate trigger for enforcement, all
maintain a distinctiveness from property within the boundaries of the Environment. See,
e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir.
2009) (ruling that the Fish and Wildlife Service may not use habitat markers as an
alternative to population counts as triggers for an incidental take or reconsultation). The
divergence that is suggested here relates to the relationship between laws that identify
atomistic units of nature-such as "fox" and "salmon"-and laws that focus on ecosystem
functionality and ecosystem services-such as the performance or functionality of a wetland
to resolve and filter pollutant levels in watersheds. The ESA is placed in this section,
instead of the section discussing ecosystem services, because its celebration of biodiversity
does not result in the direct protection of biodiversity but rather in the protection of
particular animals that might contribute to biodiversity. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1533.
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524-26 (1897) (upholding the
federal authority to regulate activities on private land that effectively enclose public lands
from access).
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without the influence of humans. 1 27 The Wilderness Act identifies
wilderness "in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape" and defines the term to signify "an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain."128 Not all lands or
landscapes garner the protection afforded to untrammeled lands, so the
values of particular environments (such as those under the Wilderness
Act) do not extend generally to nature. 29 Indicative of this result is
that wilderness areas can be identified by reference to a map, partitioned from capturable property, and the relevant values can be
protected from intrusions.
By linking this understanding of nature as the Environment to the
notion of boundaries underlying Property, law was able to implement
new values by keeping them distinct from the privatization tendency of
capture. Bounding the Environment allowed law to identify nature
because it also allowed law to identify the places and things that were
recognized as exhibiting the values of the Environment. In the
meantime, boundaries allowed law to identify which persons had a
sufficient interest to sue on behalf of nature (those persons who
effectively pierced the boundaries of nature).ao Finally, bounding
nature allowed environmental protection to coexist with property, but it
did so in a curious manner: on private property the presence of
Environment was competitive with Property. Under Property, the value
of natural things was in their transformation and use; under the
Environment, the value of natural things was in their nonuse and

127. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1062,
1064-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the Act allows human use of such natural
areas, but not commercial use, even to the extent of prohibiting a sockeye salmon
enhancement project when the primary benefit is realized in economic terms).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
129. Important, then, is the insight provided by William Cronon's constructivism
critique of the "natural" idea of wilderness. Cronon states, "The time has come to rethink
wilderness." William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 (William

Cronon ed., 1996). He has argued that by identifying wilderness and "natural" in a
particular place or a particular thing, we were actually identifying natural as "that place
over there" or "that thing." See id. at 85-86. By partitioning, or even quarantining,
wilderness from humans, what we get is a nature that we cannot touch-not for lack of
physical access but for the rhetorical relationship that we have constructed. See id.
Cronon's point is a good one: laws creating the Environment have arguably constructed a
nature that humans do not live in, that does not surround us, but that we can capture and
(for lack of a better word) quarantine. See id.
130. See Lujan, 505 U.S. at 565-67.
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nontransformation. Finding the Environment on one's property was a
detraction, or perhaps more accurately, a property defect.
Because of the divide between values of the Environment and those of
Property, the onset of the Environment reinvigorated the challenge to
Mugler v. Kansas"a' through the argument that property could be
invaded by regulation for purposes of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'32 Indeed, when in conflict with captured property, the
Environment could be understood as a mappable area that exhibits
particular nonhuman uses-not to the exclusion of human benefits but as
an addition to human benefits. As a thing with boundaries, the
Environment might intrude into or overlap with an owner's property
boundaries, in which case the law could question the extent of the
overlap. From here, a mere physical presence of the Environment made
analysis of a takings claim conceptually simple: where there was
overlap, property could be considered encumbered. If, as in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,'3 the overlap went too far or was
even complete-meaning that the boundaries of property were entirely
contained within the Environment-a categorical taking had occurred."' On the other hand, if the overlap was neither coextensive
with the Environment nor completely subsumed, as in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island' or Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,' the court would consider and balance the remaining valuable
property with the Environment."' Either way, it is because the
Environment is described in relation to its values, but identified by
reference to its boundaries, that we can compare and balance the values
of the land.
The third consequence of the Environment's boundedness is fragmentation in the way nature is regulated. Property's legacy of observing
different rules of capture for different things in nature-whales, foxes,
bees, land, and so forth-corresponded to an enormous body of laws
intended to individually regulate each component of nature with little
collaboration between them. As Tony Arnold notes, "Each regime has a
different 'expert culture'-different professional and organizational norms,

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

123 U.S. 623 (1887).
U.S. CONST. amend V.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See id. at 1014.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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different ways of looking at the world, and different ways of conceptual,,138
izing problems and solutions.
The ecological limitation of this approach has been most evident in
conceptualizing both the challenge of and responsibility for climate
change. Of course, the Environment approach encouraged an information-gathering exercise that was missing from the Property approach,
resulting in a richer and deeper understanding of nature and its
processes. In addition, the Environment provided a platform from which
the impacts of climate change could be considered significantly adverse.
Yet the Environment has arguably been unable to provide effective tools
for responding to impacts that accumulate throughout a natural system,
and more specifically, it did not provide the conceptual means to
inculpate anthropogenic contributions to natural processes. Essentially,
the question of cause and effect in climate change has caused too much
confusion in identifying either the Property or Environment boundaries
at issue.
The Environment reconceived the values attributed to things in nature
by asserting that natural, nonhuman entities and processes contained
13
In the regulation
some level of pre-capture (or pre-property) value.a
of land uses, this new understanding of nature encouraged the identification of nature as a collection of different objects-air, water, insect, fox,
and so on-that were valuable independent of their use. Nature under
the Environment approach possessed pre-property value, and emboldened by a more scientifically sophisticated assessment of environmental
attributes, law strived to protect those attributes against the impacts of
land-use choices. What was protected was, of course, the thing in the
Environment. Wetlands were mapped based on an assessment of the
soil's ability to demonstrate wetland characteristics.14 0 Point-source
discharges of pollutants were controlled because they would invade the
values of particular surface water bodies by causing severe impacts on
segments of the Environment, such as navigable waters (and the
particular living things that inhabited or visited such waters, including

138. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction:Integrating Water Controls and Land
Use Controls: New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW
CONTROL LAND USE?, supra note 6, at 1, 35.
139. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
140.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, WESTLANDS RESEARCH PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT

Y-87-1, WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL (1987).

The manual defines "wetlands" as

"[tihose areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Id. at A14.
The manual details wetland soil characteristics. Id. at 20-28.
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fish or humans)."' Water quality was premised on the impacts of
particular actions on water quality segments, ensuring that the
Environment could be subject to a rather exacting calculus for its
relationship to property and economic worth. 14 2 The Environment did
not shed the boundaries so central to Property but applied the idea of
boundaries to things that were not property.
IV.

A.

ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, THINGS THAT ARE CONNECTED TO OTHER
THINGS, AND PROPERTY WITHOUT BOUNDARIES

In the Matter of Pierson v. Post
Mr. Post is not entitled to possession of the fox
carcass. That said, the court is happy to make a finding
that Mr. Post in fact killed the fox (and most of the other
living things in the affected forest), but this is not to imply
that the law awards Mr. Post with a vested interest in the
fox. Nature's feat-producing this fox-cannot now be
repeated due to the actions of Mr. Post, and we will not
reward Mr. Post for so depriving the public of this natural
capital.
We make one point that has obviously occurred to
Mr. Post: human actions in nature may have effects
throughout an ecosystem, and when human actions impair
those ecosystem services that benefit human health and
property, we do not treat such acts as private or independent of the public interest. Or more accurately, Mr. Post
has intruded upon the ecosystem in a manner that will
deny existing beneficiaries of the services they rely upon
from natural ecosystems. We liken this act to a theft of
natural and economic advantage on such a broad scope
that Mr. Post should avail himself of a better lawyer than
the one who pled this action for conversion. If it turns out
that those denied of services are unable to benefit from
statutory codifications of these interests, we feel confident
that the doctrines of nuisance, private or public, will
operate to their advantage.
To the extent that Mr. Post has taken the art of
hunting to a new level, we are certainly impressed.
However, he failed to consider-or did consider but ulti-

141. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1252(a) (2006).
142. See, e.g., id. § 1251(a).
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mately ignored-the ecosystem effects of his actions. Only
a few need be mentioned here. Mr. Post's relocation of the
stream will deprive the ecosystem dependents of much
needed flood control, water purification, and climate
regulation. The clearing activities, at the least, have
reduced the region's natural capacity for carbon sequestration, habitat provision, erosion control, nutrient and soil
retention, biomass production, and recreational opportunities (including fox hunting). Mr. Post's soil disruption has
likely impaired the ecosystem's ability to monitor, utilize,
and supply the system with sufficient and timely water to
satisfy ecosystem and domestic needs. The eradication of
critters in this area has thwarted the biodiversity services
on which we all depend.
Obviously, there are some ecosystem services and
redundancies in such services that are not intended to be
excluded from this brief analysis. There are always
unintended omissions of insight, particularly in matters of
emerging science. Yet we are sadly reminded of a recent
interview that drives home both the point of ecosystem
services and Mr. Post's ignorance of ecosystem health:
A large flying fox eats a fruit ingesting its seeds. Flying over the
tropical forests it eventually deposits the seeds at the base of another
tree far from the first. One of these seeds takes root, sprouts, and in
thirty years time a new tree waits for another flying fox to spread its
[seed].
In the Southeast Asian tropics an astounding 80 percent of seeds are
spread not by wind, but by animals: birds, bats, rodents, even
elephants. But in a region where animals of all shapes and sizes are
being wiped out by uncontrolled hunting and poaching-what will the
forests of the future look like?1 43
Of course, in the case at hand, we know what the forest
will look like in the future-it is gone today, and it will be
gone tomorrow, along with the fruits, foxes, birds, bats,
and insects.
In a separate action that has been joined with the
underlying cause for conversion, the Friends of the Fox ask
for injunctive relief and an order that Mr. Post restore the

143. Jeremy Hance, Hunting Across Southeast Asia Weakens Forests' Survival, An
Interview with Richard Corlett, MONGABAY.COM (Nov. 8,2009), http://news.mongabay.com/
2009/1108-hance-corlett.html.
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forest and the stream. Mr. Post objects vehemently,
suggesting that the Friends' complaint should be dismissed
for want of standing. Indeed, the Friends did not allege
that a single one of its members had visited the site, swam
in this stretch of the creek, shared space with the fox, or
otherwise has an interest in the specific property that Mr.
Post has transformed. Mr. Post contends that the remoteness of the alleged injuries tolls against the Friends'
standing. That, however, is no longer the test for standing. The Friends alleged that some of its members live in
the watershed of this no-named creek, and the relocation
of this creek has caused turbidity and sedimentation in the
stream. Other members draw drinking water from wells
and have alleged that the stream relocation has altered
the rate and quality of aquifer recharge. Still other
members allege injury from the removal of habitat by Mr.
Post, an action that has exposed wildlife in the forest to
edge effects and predators, displaced wildlife populations,
removed food supplies, and driven wildlife away from the
properties owned by members of the Friends. In holding
the Friends' allegations sufficient to plead standing, we
recognize that the injury element of standing can be met
by what might have previously been considered too remote
an injury. Under current science, however, we hold that
in the same manner that leveling the forest may have
killed the fox, the destruction of ecosystem services may
well have a substantial economic and health-based impact
on the members of the plaintiffs group.
Signed, The Court
B.

Ecosystem Services: Things Without Boundaries
By all accounts, ecosystem services are vital to the production of
ecosystem goods and the maintenance of a livable environment. 1" As
144. As noted above, one accepted definition of the term "ecosystem services" is "a wide
range of conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that
are part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life." Daily et al., supra note 9, at 2.
Other definitions vary but retain the central importance of ecosystem functionality and its
importance to human well-being. In their watershed article, Robert Costanza and his
colleagues define the term as follows: "Ecosystem functions refer variously to the habitat,
biological or system properties or processes of ecosystems. Ecosystem goods (such as food)
and services (such as waste assimilation) represent the benefits human populations derive,
directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions." Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the
World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, NATURE, May 15, 1997, at 253, 253.
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such, the relevance of ecosystem services to human needs and the
manner in which ecosystem services add value (at least by producing
things that we value as property) are far reaching: ecosystems provide
products that directly benefit humans from their consumption, use, and
trade, such as food, fuel, fresh water, clean air, and building materials;
ecosystems regulate natural conditions and hazards by recharging
aquifers, filtering water and air, reducing floods, controlling temperature, and sequestering carbon; ecosystems support the productivity of
ecosystems through soil and oxygen production, nutrient cycling, organic
decomposition, and habitat provision; and ecosystems offer other
meaningful but less tangible services, such as providing recreational,
spiritual, and educational opportunities. 14 5
As James Salzman notes, ecosystem services have typically and
historically been taken for granted or assumed to be valueless.146
Perhaps the problem is in how we identify what nature has to offer:
"Our unthinking reliance on ecosystem services is due in part, no doubt,
to society's dissociation between the milk carton and medicines in our
home, on the one hand, and the services of nutrient cycling and
From the
biodiversity, on the other, that made these possible."' 4
"Ecosystem Services" perspective, engaging ecology serves the purpose
of transitioning the perspective of ecosystems as expendable to functional, "from amenity to living technology."148 At present, the Ecosystem
Services approach to nature is beginning to overwhelm the stalwarts of
the Property scheme, both in its understanding of nature and its
approach to law. This section illustrates how the shift to an Ecosystem
Services approach will require us to reorganize our legal understanding

Similarly, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, reports define the term as follows:
Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include
provisioningservices such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulatingservices that

affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that
provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supportingservices such
as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling. The human species, while
buffered against environmental changes by culture and technology, is fundamentally dependent on the flow of ecosystem services.
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS,

at V (2005)

[hereinafter MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT] (citation omitted),

http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf.
145. See supra text accompanying note 144.
146. See James Salzman et al., ProtectingEcosystem Services: Science, Economics, and
Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311 (2001).
147.

Id.

148.

E. Gregory McPherson, Accounting for Benefits and Costs of Urban Greenspace,

22 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 41, 41 (1992).
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of natural things so that boundaries are not prioritized over the natural
processes that produce value in property.

1. Ecosystem Services as a Dialogue on Form and Function in
Nature. This idea of describing nature in terms of ecological processes
is not particularly new. Neither is the notion that natural processes
benefit human well-being. However, the concept of Ecosystem Services,
the way that this concept conceives of value in nature, and the attempt
to explicitly construct ecosystem services as incidents of property value
are relatively recent topics.14 9 This approach recognizes that the
individual fox derives meaning both as a good from the ecosystem and
from the services it provides within the ecosystem.
The most obvious contrast between Ecosystem Services and the
Property description of things in nature is Ecosystem Services' rejection
of Property's insistence that nature becomes valuable only through
transformation.5 0 Ecosystem Services attributes value to the functionality of ecosystems, in which the individual components of ecosystems
are identified for the services they provide throughout the ecosystem
itself and through human benefits."' A recent National Research
Council publication explains the features of Ecosystem Services as
follows:
Ecosystem structure refers to both the composition of the ecosystem
(i.e., its various parts) and the physical and biological organization
defining how those parts are organized. A leopard frog or a marsh
plant such as a cattail, for example, would be considered a component
of an aquatic ecosystem and hence part of its structure. Ecosystem
function describes a process that takes place in an ecosystem as a
result of the interactions of the plants, animals, and other organisms
in the ecosystem with each other or their environment. Primary
production (the process of converting inorganic compounds into organic
compounds by plants, algae, and chemoautotrophs) is an example of an
ecosystem function. Ecosystem structure and function provide various
ecosystem goods and services of value to humans such as fish for

149. See J.B. Ruh1 & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem
Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 158-61 (2007). J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman
attribute the birth of the idea of ecosystem services to the following three pivotal
publications (listed in alphabetical order) from 1997-1998: Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey
Heal, Economic Returns from the Biosphere, NATURE, Feb. 12, 1998, at 629; Costanza et al.,
supra note 144, at 253; Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What are Ecosystem Services?, in
NATURE's SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMs 1, 3 (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997).
150. See Sax, supra note 39, at 1442 (distinguishing between the "transformative
economy" and the "economy of nature," which recognizes value in ecosystems).
151. See supra text accompanying note 144.

2011]1

THREE STORIES ABOUT NATURE

577

recreational or commercial use, clean water to swim in or drink, and
various esthetic qualities (e.g., pristine mountain streams or wilderness
areas). 12

Ecosystem goods and services provide for the needs of human health,
Ecosystem
market preferences, and other anthropocentric needs.
structure and function determine how and to what extent an ecosystem
is capable of providing those goods and services. An impairment of
ecosystem structure and function impacts the ability of the ecosystem to
deliver goods and services.
Notably, the Ecosystem Services approach also diverges from the
Environment in the particular values that are attributed to nature.
Under Ecosystem Services, the capacity of an ecosystem to deliver
ecosystem goods and services is a coincidence of ecosystem structure and
processes-form and function. Hence, the Ecosystem Services approach
and the Environment approach do not diverge from the Property
approach in the same way: when the Environment replaces Property's
focus on transformation with a nonuse or inherent value, Ecosystem
Services accepts a use valuation (an economic valuation) for ecosystem
goods based on the idea that ecosystems can be valued for the services
they provide and for being able to continue to produce the goods in the
future.
A recent decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit illustrates the limitations in regulating the nature described in
the Environment and the challenges the courts have faced in moving
towards an Ecosystem Services approach. In Ohio Valley Environmental
Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co.,153 three environmental groups challenged the Army Corps of Engineers' approval of four separate permits
allowing the mining applicants to fill West Virginia streams as part of
their surface coal mining operations. The operations involved "mountaintop removal" mining, in which underground coal seams are exposed
by blasting soils and rocks from mountaintops. The "spoils" of this
method, which for the most part cannot be replaced, are dumped into
adjacent valleys, inevitably burying streams and impacting the
watershed.1 54 Ultimately, this action involved the approval of twenty-

152. COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING AND VALUING THE SERVICES OF AQUATIC AND RELATED
TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES:
TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 1 n. 1(2005) [hereinafter CAVSARTEI.

153. 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009).
154. Id. at 185-86. Mountaintop removal mining, which is considered by many to be
among the dirtiest mining practices, "leaves a legacy of foul streams, hideous slag heaps
and polluted air." HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS: A BIOGRAPHY

OF A DEPRESSED AREA x (1962); see also Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to
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three separate fills of valleys and the resulting impacts of over thirteen
miles of headwater streams. 155
For purposes here, the relevant issues in this case involve the
standards governing the approval of a § 404 permit under the Clean
Water Act."' The Corps is authorized to permit "the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites,""' which includes the deposit of mining overburden into waters. 58 In analyzing the significance of the impacts from the proposal,
the Corps is required to make particular factual determinations to
ensure that the appropriate wetland values and functions have been
considered.'

Mountaintop Removal: EnvironmentalInjustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL.
L. 21, 42 (2004). In this case, the applicants sought compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006), and approval from the
Corps under § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d
at 187.
155. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 187.
156. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The Corps made findings to support a finding of
no significant impact (FONSI) for each of the four projects on the basis of the mitigation
measures planned for the operations. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 642 (S.D. W. Va. 2007). After the district court vacated the
permits and enjoined the Corps and applicants from acting on the permits, the Corps and
applicants sought review. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 186.
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
158. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 431
(4th Cir. 2003).
159. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 198. Pursuant to the authority granted to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under CWA § 404, the EPA promulgated the CWA
§ 404(b)(1) Guidelines in conjunction with the Corps and codified them at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230
(2009). See generally 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(f) (2009) (stating the issuance of § 404 permits "will
be in accordance with guidelines developed by the Administrator of EPA in conjunction
with the Secretary of the Army"). The Corps is required to assess impacts to both
structure and function; thus, they must
[d]etermine the nature and degree of effect that the proposed discharge will have,
both individually and cumulatively, on the structure and function of the aquatic
ecosystem and organisms. Consideration shall be given to the effect at the
proposed disposal site of potential changes in substrate characteristics and
elevation, water or substrate chemistry, nutrients, currents, circulation,
fluctuation, and salinity, on the recolonization and existence of indigenous aquatic
organisms or communities.
40 C.F.R. § 230.11(e) (emphasis added). In addition, the Corps is not authorized to permit
an activity that "will cause or contribute to significant degredation of the waters of the
United States" by imposing significant adverse impacts on aquatic life, the diversity,
productivity, or stability of ecosystems, or other more distinctly human values. Id.
§ 230.10(c). As indicated in the regulations, "effects contributing to significant degradation
considered either individually or collectively, include: . . . loss of fish and wildlife habitat
or loss of the capacity of a wetland to assimilate nutrients, purify water, or reduce wave
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The proposed impairment of several miles of streams could have
triggered a factual inquiry into the functions served by the affected
streams. Such an analysis would have allowed for a determination of
whether the proposed mitigation would be appropriate and adequate to
protect the beneficiaries of the lost aquatic ecosystem functions; however,
the analysis was not performed. Rather than investigating the functions
of headwater streams or considering the likelihood that the chosen
mitigation would protect the local ecology, the Corps calculated the
linear feet of lost streams and approved mitigation requirements of a
one-to-one replacement to be implemented by enhancement of existing
drainage ditches."'o The Corps' analysis of replacement of stream
structure effectively acted as a "surrogate" for analysis of stream
function.1 61 The majority in the Fourth Circuit upheld the Corps'
approach and held that, although the Corps is required to consider "the
effect at the proposed disposal site," 62 "whatever the role of headwater
streams in overall watershed ecology, the Corps is not required to
differentiate between headwater and other stream types in the
determination of mitigation measures.""' A mile of stream, here or
64
there, is the same thing.1

energy." Id. The determination of a proposal's effects on stream structure and function
are thus imperative in the CWA § 404 permitting process. See id. § 230.5(a) (referring to
§ 230.11 as one of the "principal regulatory provisions of the Guidelines"); id. § 230.10(c)
(requiring that "[flindings of significant degradation related to the proposed discharge shall
be based upon appropriate factual determinations, evaluations, and tests" pursuant to
various subparts of the Guidelines).
160. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 203-04. The gravamen of this case involves a subsequent
regulatory guidance letter stating that the Corps "will determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether to use a functional assessment or acreage surrogates for determining mitigation
and for describing authorized impacts." U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, REGULATORY
GUIDANCE LETTER No. 02-2, GUIDANCE ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION PROJECTS FOR
AQUATIC RESOURCE IMPACTS UNDER THE CORPS REGULATORY PROGRAM PURSUANT TO
SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT
OF 1899 at 2 (2002). This guidance letter seeks to avoid the requirement for a functional

assessment "where functional assessment is not practical" and instead allows the Corps to
consider mitigation proposals that "should generally replace linear feet of stream on a oneto-one basis." Id. at 3. In this case, the Corps did not have available a stream assessment
of the functionality of headwater streams. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 222.
161. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 199.
162. 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(e).
163. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 203. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the Corps
on grounds that there are several levels of adequacy in mitigation, and mitigation decisions
are generally led by a rule of practicality. See id. at 203-04; see also Memorandum of
Agreement, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990).
164. Although the history of "no net loss" often includes allusions to loss of functionality, it is less clear that functionality played the most instrumental role in the policy. See,
e.g., George Bush, Remarks to Members of Ducks Unlimited, June 8, 1989, THE AMERICAN
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From the Ohio Valley controversy it is easy to see that managing the
transition to an Ecosystem Services understanding of nature will require
a concerted effort to identify for the courts the important distinctions
between the bounded Environment and ecosystem functionality. It is
noteworthy that from the perspective of the Environment, the one-to-one
replacement ratio approved in Ohio Valley must be considered a
significant victory for nature: loss of the headwater streams at issue
should not have raised a value problem under the Property paradigm,
but here the Corps navigated the limits of property and found authority
to require replacement of the streams.' From the Ecosystem Services
perspective, however, a no-net-loss rule measured in linear feet makes
as little sense as the conflation of wetland boundaries to indicate the
edge of the ecological influences and needs of wetlands. Even a
successful replacement of miles of streams will fail on a large ecological
scale if the functionality of the watershed as a whole is impaired from
the loss of these particularstreams. Attention only to the structure of an
ecosystem is not sufficient to account for ecosystem functionality.
2. Ecosystem Services and the Economic Value of Nature. The
thrust behind Ecosystem Services is that a functionality approach
provides a better policy framework for ensuring sustainable and
productive ecosystems over the long term. This approach insists that
ecology and economics wed to enable both to better provide an accounting of noncommodity services provided by functioning ecosystems; either
one alone is unable to accomplish the task.'
However, when used in
unison, such as in the effort to estimate economic values for ecosystem

PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17125 (last visited

Nov. 7, 2010).
And I want to ask you today what the generations to follow will say of us 40 years
from now. It could be they'll report the loss of many million acres more, the
extinction of species, the disappearance of wilderness and wildlife; or they could
report something else. They could report that sometime around 1989 things began
to change and that we began to hold on to our parks and refuges and that we
protected our species and that in that year the seeds of a new policy about our
valuable wetlands were sown, a policy summed up in three simple words: "No net
loss."
Id.
165. Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 204.
166. CAVSARTE, supra note 152, at 153. The consort of the two is the challenge of
ecology and the promise of ecosystem services: "efforts to preserve natural areas, acquire
new greenspace, initiate plantings, and manage existing greenspace resources are
frequently hampered by our inability to fully appraise the environmental services
greenspace (i.e. the urban forest) provides." McPherson, supra note 148, at 41.
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services, ecology and economics can provide persuasive reasons for
rethinking the manner in which we treat nature.16 7
The ecosystem benefits provided by wetlands and watershed processes
offer good examples of the manner in which ecosystem services provide
economic value and have been given well-deserved attention.16 8
Another successful area in which ecosystem knowledge is being
translated into economic value is found in the growing body of literature
on urban forest services and urban tree canopy. In comparing the
benefits of trees in urban areas (for example, climate moderation,
stormwater and air quality control, and habitat provision) with the
potential liabilities (for example, pollen production and water use),
studies have repeatedly concluded that the economic benefits of
ecosystem functionality outweigh the costs of maintaining a healthy
urban forest. 1 69
The analysis of ecosystem functionality has improved-particularly over
the last fifteen years-as more information has been gathered relating to
the costs of constructing replacement service facilities (for example,
stormwater detention facilities to replace the stormwater filtering and
retention services provided by trees) and as needs have increased for
167. Costanza and his colleagues, for instance, estimated that "the annual value of
[global ecosystem] services is US$16-54 trillion, with an estimated average of US$33
trillion. The real value is almost certainly much larger, even at the current margin."
Costanza et al., supra note 144, at 259.
168. See, e.g., Salzman et al., supra note 146, at 314-18. Cf David J. Nowak & Jeffrey
T. Walton, Projected Urban Growth (2000-2050) and its Estimated Impact on the US Forest

Resource, 2005 J. FORESTRY 383, 388 (finding that forests provide economic value under an
ecosystems approach).
169. McPherson, supranote 148, at 42-50 (stating that"jalverage annual benefits from
the selected environmental services are projected to exceed costs by US$15.48 per tree (2.6
benefit-cost ratio)" before discounting adjustments are made). Jessica Sargent-Michaud of
The Trust for Public Land estimated a return on conservation easement investments by
the State of Colorado by comparing the investment-state grants for easement acquisition
and tax credits-to the value of the services provided by the predominant ecosystem type
for each acre subject to a conservation easement under the program. Jessica SargentMichaud, A Return on Investment: The Economic Value of Colorado's Conservation
Easements, THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND (2009), http://www.tpl.org/content-documents/-

Final%20report%20ecosystem%20services.pdf. She estimated that in 2008 Colorado was
receiving a return of six times the initial investment. Id. at 5.
CITY OF SEATTLE, URBAN FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN 3 (Apr. 2007) (finding that

increasing in canopy cover from "18% to 36% would more than double current environmental and economic benefits"), http://www.seattle.gov/environment/documents/FinalUFMP
.pdf- Monte Mitchell, Conservation is Paying Off, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 24, 2011,

availableathttp://www2.journalnow.com/news/20 11/feb/24/wsmetO1-report-conservation-ispaying-off-ar-808546/ (summarizing a recent report by The Trust for Public Lands: "Every
$1 invested in buying land for conservation in North Carolina returns $4 in economic value
from natural resource goods and services. . . .").
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these services from urbanization and industrial processes. Hence, the
City of Vancouver, Washington, has noted in its Urban Forestry
Management Plan that "[uinlike traditional gray infrastructure capital
improvements, such as transportation and water systems, which begin
to depreciate as soon as they are installed, green infrastructure accrues
value and provides greater services as time passes."170 In order to
comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA),"' the Clean Air Act
(CAA),1 72 and the Clean Water Act (CWA),173 Vancouver specifically
incorporates urban canopy benefits into its strategies. 1 74 In addition
to water and air quality benefits, habitat provision, and cooling benefits
of urban canopy, Vancouver relies on the promise of economic advantage
stemming from a healthy and mature canopy cover.175 Vancouver
estimates that its existing canopy provides the same services as an
annualized $12.9 million of avoided cost to taxpayers from installing
stormwater retention structures, saves $78.3 million in air pollutant
removal services, and reduces cooling costs by approximately 4% from
shade.177 The economic benefits of the canopy include Vancouver's
sense of self and place:
Improving aesthetics of our community has tangible economic benefits.
Systems of open space and bike trails give a community a reputation
for being a good place to live and visit. Increased recreational and
community activity attracts new businesses and stimulates tourism.
Well-maintained trees improve residential "curb appeal" and increase
potential buyers' willingness to pay a 3-7% premium for property.
Trees in retail settings increase shoppers' willingness to pay for goods
and services by 12%. Shoppers also indicate that they are willing to
drive farther and stay longer if a retail district is well-landscaped with
trees. "

170. City of Vancouver, Wash., Urban Forestry Management Plan 7 (Dec. 2007)
[hereinafter UFMPI, available at http://www.cityofvancouver.us/parks-recreation/parks
trails/urban forestry/pdflUFMP-fimal-web.pdf.
171. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006).
172. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
173. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
174. UFMP, supra note 170, at 9.
175.

See id.

176. Id. at 1. Vancouver adopts estimates made by American Forests in a 2001 review
of the City's urban forest ecosystem. Id. at 7 n.4.
177. Id. at 8.
178. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).

2011]1

THREE STORIES ABOUT NATURE

583

Based on this review and those upon which Vancouver relies, Vancouver
estimates an annual net benefit per tree of $1-8 for small trees, $19-25
for medium-sized trees, and $48-53 for large trees."'
American Forests has noted similar economic advantages in their
series on urban ecosystem analysis.so In a recent tree canopy analysis
of Mecklenburg County and the City of Charlotte, North Carolina,
American Forests noted that in 2008 Charlotte's tree canopy covered
46% of its jurisdiction and was estimated to provide 662 million cubic
feet of stormwater detention services, to remove 7.2 million pounds of air
pollutants, to store 3.7 million tons of carbon, and to sequester 28,000
tons of carbon."' Valuation for these services is based on the cost of
constructing a means of providing replacement services: $1.3 billion for
stormwater detention and $19.2 million per year of air pollutant
removal.' 82 American Forests also assessed the costs of losing tree
canopy:
Between 1985 and 2008, Mecklenburg County, lost 33% of its tree
canopy and 3% of its open space, while gaining 60% of urban area.
These changes resulted in the loss of the tree canopy's ability to
naturally manage 252 million cubic feet of stormwater, valued at $504
million using a local engineering cost of $2 per cubic foot. The
County's green infrastructure also lost the ability to remove approximately 3.8 million lbs. of air pollutants annually, valued at $8.8 million
per year . . . .'s3
The economic component of Ecosystem Services has drawn its fair
share of critics. The difficulty here is not that functionality is a new
topic for ecologists, and it is not that environmental quality is a new
topic for economists. The problem is that the services that ecosystems
provide (especially the "indirect" benefits from ecosystems)" have

179. Id.
180. American Forests, Urban Ecosystem Analysis: Mecklenburg County and the City
of Charlotte, North Carolina (April 2010), available at http://www.americanforests.org/
resources/urbanforests/analysis.php.
181. Id. at 3.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
184. In a United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service report, the authors
distinguish "[dlirect use" of ecosystem goods, which "involves some form of direct physical
interaction with the good or service," from "[iindirect use" of ecosystem goods, which
"involves [ecosystem services] that contribute to the quality of an ecosystem good or a
produced good." U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Service Research & Development, State of
Knowledge: Ecosystem Services from Forests 10 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.fs.
fed.us/ecosystemservices/pdf/state-of-knowledge.pdf.
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historically remained invisible, and they have done so at least in part
because property owners may have no means of directly capturing
benefits from ecosystem services provided on their lands, as there are no
markets for most of these services. 85 In addition, it is typically "the
case that the value of ecosystem services becomes apparent only after
such services are diminished or lost, which occurs once the natural
processes supporting the production of these services have been
In this sense, the most persuasive point
sufficiently degraded." 8
made by Ecosystem Services advocates is the economic one: preserving
functional ecosystems is economically advantageous. In many cases,
preserving or protecting ecosystem functionality for purposes of receiving
clean water, flood control, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration, among
other benefits, will be less expensive than providing replacement goods
or services."' Hence, adopting the Ecosystem Services approach is an

185. See Salzman et al., supra note 146, at 312 ("The services themselves have no
market value for the simple reason that no markets exist in which they can be exchanged.").
186. CAVSARTE, supra note 152, at 154; see also Daily et al., supra note 9, at 12
("[Pleople whose activities disrupt ecosystem services often do not pay directly for the cost
of those lost services.").
187. The Forest Service reports that there have been five general methods of ecosystem
goods and services valuation. U.S. Dep't of Agric., supra note 184, at 10. The first method-market prices, which are dependant on market mechanisms-may produce economic values
for some ecosystem goods but may be entirely unhelpful for goods and services for which
there is no competitive market. The other four methods-revealed preference, stated
preference, production function, and replacement cost methods-help estimate value in the
absence of competitive markets. Id. at 10-11. Of these, the Forest Service reports that
replacement cost-used to measure the cost of replacing a lost good or service-is often used
to provide value of ecosystem services. Id. at 11. An additional method, known as benefits
transfer, estimates the value of ecosystem goods and services based on the studies of other
ecosystem services or locations.

Benefit Transfer Method, ECOSYSTEM VALUATION,

http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/benefittransfer.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). This
methodology is typically used when there is inadequate information to estimate the value
of a particular ecosystem service or characteristic. Id. Under this method, economic values
of ecosystem benefits in one location or context, when there are published studies or
sufficient information, are adapted to provide an estimate of ecosystem benefits at another
location or in another context. Id. Although benefits-transfer methodology provides a good
starting point for thinking about the economic valuation of ecosystem services, it is only
an initial assessment of value. See id. The limitations of this method include that reliable
studies for the particular ecosystem feature may be unavailable, either because they have
not been accomplished or because they have not been published; existing studies may not
provide sufficient data to enable an accurate transfer analysis or otherwise be difficult to
verify; and there may be insufficient data on the particular site, location, or other specific
characteristics of the subject ecosystem to allow for an accurate extrapolation of which
ecosystem features allow for analogical valuation.
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effort to make ecosystems visible by making nature an asset instead of
a defect.18 8
Although the effort to converge ecology with economics allows the
Ecosystem Services approach to adopt a familiar vocabulary,' 9 the
wedding is challenging.9 o The manner in which Ecosystem Services
conceives of natural processes-as interdependent and dynamic-raises a
host of ambiguous questions and equations. As Janet Neuman notes,
I know that if I take my checkbook to the lumberyard, I can write a
check for fifty dollars and take home a certain number of two-by-fours.
But how many murrelet nests would that fifty dollars buy, and who
would take my money? If I lived in Wheeler, Oregon, and wanted to
assure that the Tillamook watershed would provide clean drinking
water for my grandchildren, how much would that cost, and who could
I pay for it even if I wanted to? Will there be jobs for my grandchil-

188. One way of thinking about this advantage is based on the simple idea that
ecosystem services analysis allows for a more persuasive application because it adopts the
vocabulary of economics. That is, assuming that much of our environmental policy-making
is led by cost-benefit analysis, ecosystem services replaces the comparison of apples to
oranges (for example, the economic value of property versus the value of knowing a pristine
environment exists) with an apples to apples comparison. Ecosystem services allow for
realization of nature as having a nonuse value. Until our decision-making paradigm
changes, ecosystem services will enable environmental protection in ways that were not
attainable under previous paradigms. As was pointed out for me in a casual conversation
with Marc Poirier, this does not mean that the ecosystem will prevail by way of
preservation in every case. "In some cases, perhaps many, a focus on services will not
justify conservation of biodiversity or certain natural habitats" or may "be largely
irrelevant to environmental protection," but it probably does lead to protection of ecosystem
function on an entirely different scale, typically in efforts to craft appropriation mitigation
for lost ecosystem functions. Salzman et al., supra note 146, at 312-13.
189. Marc Poirier notes that "[t]he ecosystems services approach seeks to quantify the
long-term value of environmental services in order to make them concrete and recognizable,
thus facilitating cost-benefit arguments against their degradation; some also aspire to
create markets in ecosystem services." Marc R. Poirier, NaturalResources, Congestion,and
the Feminist Future: Aspects of Frischmann's Theory of Infrastructure Resources, 35
ECOLOGY L.Q. 179, 197 (2008).

190. The world under Property is comprised of potential commodities that have value
in a way that is relevant to the Ecosystem Services scheme. These things-foxes, plants,
and minerals, among others-are ecosystem goods that can be valued for how they can be
used. However, the Ecosystem Services approach diverges from Property by recognizing
that particular, essential ecosystem goods and services might not have an approved market
value and by rejecting the notion that any individual object is valued only for its
anthropocentric use or market value. Ecosystem Services also incorporates the notion that
nature provides services for which there may be no commodity market but which have
economic value nonetheless.
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dren to keep them in Wheeler? Will they be loggers, fishing guides,
owners of a saltwater taffy shop for tourists, or carbon traders?'
Some ecosystem goods may be susceptible to market valuation, yet the
value of ecosystem services is difficult to estimate merely by reference
to the behaviors of willing buyers and sellers. In large part, the
difficulty lies in the marketplace: property is only beginning to be traded
in consideration of the ecosystem services provided and received.
Calculating the value of ecosystem services on a case-by-case basis is a
complex undertaking that is made more difficult by the mere fact that
it requires an adaptation of traditional neoclassical economics to
noncommodified goods and services that did not arise from human labor.
Difficulties also derive from the dynamic nature of ecosystems, which
simultaneously provide multiple services that markets may cast as
competing.192
More problematic, however, is that sufficient information about the
benefits of ecosystems is currently available for only a narrow range of
relevant ecosystem services,"' and as such, uncertainty continues to
pervade Ecosystem Services valuation. This uncertainty is understandable as the science and economics of Ecosystem Services is evolving, even
if at an explosive rate, yet they remain at a nascent stage. The question
is what to do about the present shortage of information on ecosystem
services. Perhaps, as Gretchen Daily and her colleagues have noted,
these circumstances should not gravitate towards avoidance of Ecosystem Services analysis, as "it may be prudent to establish fundamental

191. Janet Neuman, Thinking Inside the Box: Looking for Ecosystem Services Within
a Forested Watershed, 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 173, 198 (2006-2007) (footnote omitted).
192. The mechanism for this shift in valuation-essentially a shift in valuation
methods-is the centralization of the concept of interconnectedness. An Ecosystem Services
approach recognizes that a multitude of ecological features contributes to the realization
of ecosystem goods and services. Costanza et al., supra note 144, at 253-55. The process
of producing these goods requires the participation of both ecosystem structure and
function. See id. at 254-55. The loss of any particular component in this production
process may impair the production capacity of the entire ecosystem. See id. at 255. Such
components, also referred to as "natural capital," determine the capacity of the ecosystem
to be productive. Id. at 254-55. Competition in this regard will inevitably, but not
exclusively, arise in controversies over altered ecosystems where restoration of a long-ago
altered system may impair ecosystem services that properties and wildlife have come to
enjoy (for example, a dike removal for purposes of floodplain and wetland restoration). The
Ecosystem Services approach will suffer controversies over competing ecosystem needs, but
this is not unique to Ecosystem Services.
193. CAVSARTE, supra note 152, at 193; see also Salzman et al., supra note 146, at
318. Ecosystem services accounting may be difficult to generalize from one ecosystem to
another when location plays such an important factor in ecosystem functionality.
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ecosystem protections even though uncertainty over economic values
remains."'
3.
Ecosystem Services in Agencies. Many agencies have
responded to these uncertainties by embracing the Ecosystem Services
approach."9 s At the EPA, the Ecosystem Services Research Program
has identified priorities for the identification of standards, including
indicators, measurement protocols, valuation techniques, and capacity
The EPA continues to pursue an Ecosystem Services
building."
valuation of natural resources damages under both the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)19 7
and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).19 5 After the Secretary of Agriculture
announced the establishment of the Office of Ecosystem Services and
Markets'" to help implement section 2709 of the Food, Conservation,

194. Daily et al., supra note 9, at 12.
195. Environmental law is arguably prepared for the transition to Ecosystem Services.
As argued by Robert Fischman,
the NEPA environmental analysis is the purest expression of that strand of
environmental law that seeks to expand cost-benefit balancing to include indirect
and incidental effects. Valuation of ecosystem services is exactly the kind of
assessment NEPA envisions, providing a means to inform the public and decisionmakers about what we stand to gain or lose in several alternative scenarios.
Robert L. Fischman, The EPA's NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J.
497, 500-01 (2001). On the other hand, in Clinch Coalitionv. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364
(W.D. Va. 2004), the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled
that in accounting for economic value as required under several applicable natural resource
statutes, the Forest Service did not violate any statutory directive by refusing to account
for ecosystem services associated with clean water, wildlife, recreation, scenery, and nontimber forest products, among others. Id. at 377. As noted by the district court, these
relevant statutes require the Forest Service to assess the costs and benefits associated with
the proposal, but the statutes do not specify which method should be used to make this
value assessment. Id. at 377-81.
196. For information on the EPA's direction in ecosystem services research, see
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-SAB-09-012, VALUING THE PROTECTION OF
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES: A REPORT OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

(2009) (explaining and assessing the state of ecosystem services research), and the EPA's
website at http://www.epa.gov/ecology/basic-info.htm.
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006); see also 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.13(eX2), 11.25(eX2),
11.38(c)(2)(i), 11.70 (2009); Natural Resource Damage Assessments-Type A Procedures, 61
Fed. Reg. 20560 (May 7, 1996); Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14262
(Mar. 25, 1994).
198. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006); see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10,990.11,990.21(2010);
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938 (Jan. 19, 2010)
(considering the impacts of 03 on ecosystem services and functions).
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, SECRETARY'S MEMORANDUM
199.
1056-001, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND MARKETS (2008).
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and Energy Act of 2008,200 the Forest Service continued its projected
incorporation of Ecosystem Services in asking, "How can the Agency
recognize and incorporate provisions in the planning rule for managing
lands for the sustainable delivery of ecosystem services?" 201 In 2008
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 202 published data gathered from over 200 catchments, including "wetland and surrounding
uplands contributing runoff to the wetland" in 1997 and 2004 to provide
a basis for estimating various ecosystem services. 203
This trend has launched from federal agencies into state and local
governments. For instance, the Oregon legislature has committed
resources to an Ecosystem Services approach to nature, establishing a
state policy "to support the maintenance, enhancement and restoration
of ecosystem services throughout Oregon, focusing on the protection of
land, water, air, soil and native flora and fauna."204 Oregon law now
directs state agencies to incorporate Ecosystem Services values directly
into their programs, including ecosystem services markets. 205 At the
local level, Clark County, Washington, has adopted a Habitat Conservation Ordinance,2 06 which, particularly when read in conjunction with
Clark County's Wetlands Protection Ordinance,207 provides an ecosystem approach to protecting the functions and values of riparian habitat
areas.'
Under the Clark County habitat program, proposed develop-

200. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
201. Forest Service National Forest System Land Management Planning, 74 Fed. Reg.
67165, 67168 (Dec. 18, 2009).
202. Among its many projects to embrace ecosystem services analysis, the USGS is
developing an "Ecosystem Services Analysis of Climate Change and Urban Growth in the
Upper Santa Cruz Watershed." Ecosystem Services Analysis of Climate Change and Urban
Growth in the Upper Santa Cruz Watershed; the Santa Cruz WatershedEcosystem Portfolio

Model (SCWEPM), U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://geography.wr.usgs.gov/science/ecoSevicesSCWatershed.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
203. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PROFESSIONAL PAPER
1745, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES DERIVED FROM WETLAND CONSERVATION PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES PRAIRIE POTHOLE REGION WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION RESERVE AND WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAMS (2008). The

USGS report provides estimates of particular ecosystem services: "plant community quality
and richness, carbon sequestration, floodwater storage, sediment and nutrient reduction,
and potential wildlife habitat suitability." Id.
204. 2009 Or. Laws 2680, § 2 (2009).
205. Id. § 4.
206. CLARK CNTY, WASH., CODE § 40.440 (2010).
207. Id. § 40.450.
208. See id. §§ 40.440, 40.450. Additionally, the drainage regulations in the Village of
Port Jefferson, New York, require the protection of drainage services provided by "[b] rooks,
ditches and stream beds" and the replacement of adequate drainage services at the expense
of the developer "[wlhere existing brooks, water-bearing ditches or dry stream beds giving
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ments bear the burden of "demonstrat[ing] that the activity: [slubstantially maintains the level of habitat functions and values as characterized
and documented using best available science" and "[m]inimizes habitat
disruption or alteration beyond the extent required to undertake the
proposal."2 09 Clark County also provides a list of possible mitigation
measures, all subject to the rule that "[d]isrupted functions and values
shall be mitigated on-site as a first priority, and off-site thereafter."2 1 0
Some state and local efforts to implement land-use controls based on
Ecosystem Services have received approval from the courts. For
instance, the Connecticut Supreme Court has approved of the efforts of
local governments to understand nature in a way that avoids restricting
environmental regulation to the boundaries of environmental features.2 11 In Queach Corp. v. Inland Wetlands Commission of the Town
2 12
of Branford,
the court upheld a town's regulatory scheme that
embodied an ecosystem services approach to wetlands regulation.21 3
The town's ordinance is triggered by "[any activity which substantially
diminishes the natural capacity of the inland wetland or watercourse to
support fisheries, wildlife, or other biological life, prevent flooding,
supply water, assimilate waste, facilitate drainage, provide recreation
open space or other functions.""' The plaintiffs attacked the ordi-

evidence of continual or seasonal runoff use are encountered." VILLAGE OF PORT
JEFFERSON, N.Y., CODE § 220-27(FX6) (2010), available at http://www.ecode360.com/?cust
Id=p00346.
209. CLARK CNTY., WASH., CODE § 40.440.020(AX2Xa)-(b).
210. Id. § 40.440.020(AX3)(b).
211. See Queach Corp. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n of the Town of Branford, 779 A.2d
134, 151 (Conn. 2001).
212. 779 A.2d 134 (Conn. 2001).
213. Id. at 150-51. The Connecticut Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act (CIWWA),
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-36 to 22a-45 (2009), authorizes local governments to regulate
freshwater wetlands and provides local governments with the express authority to regulate
areas that extend beyond designated wetland boundaries. 1996 Conn. Acts 417, 421, 42425 (Reg. Sess.).
214. Branford, Conn., Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations § 2.1(qqX3)(Sept.
17, 2007). The Branford regulations define regulated "[slignificant activity" to mean
any activity including, but not limited to, the following activities which may have
a substantial effect on the area for which an application has been filed, or any
other part of the wetland [or] watercourse system: ...
3.) Any activity which substantially diminishes the natural capacity of the inland
wetland or watercourse to support fisheries, wildlife, or other biological life,
prevent flooding, supply water, assimilate waste, facilitate drainage, provide
recreation open space or other functions, or ...
5.) Any activity which causes a substantial diminution of flow of a natural
watercourse, or groundwater levels of the regulated area, or ...
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nance on the ground that it attempted to regulate activities occurring
outside of wetlands, such as development in buffer areas or removal of
groundwater.2 15 In light of the ecological purposes of the state's
wetlands regulations,2 16 the court responded that although the regulations indeed required review of a groundwater withdrawal that could
affect the services provided by wetlands, the relevant sections of the
ordinance "regulate impacts on wetlands and watercourses, not
groundwater per se."' The court upheld the approach as a regulatory
effort triggered by impacts on wetlands and wetland services and did not
limit the agency to regulation of activities occurring only within wetland
boundaries.218

7.) Any activity which creates conditions of an inland wetland or watercourse
which may adversely affect the health, welfare, and safety of any individual of the
community, or
8.) Any activity which destroys unique wetland or watercourse areas having a
demonstrable scientific, educational or ecological value.
Id. § 2.1(qq)(3), (5), (7)-(8).
215. Queach, 779 A.2d at 140.
216. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-36, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/pub./chap
440.htm#sec22a-36.htm, provides,
The inland wetlands and watercourses of the state of Connecticut are an
indispensable and irreplaceable but fragile natural resource with which the
citizens of the state have been endowed. The wetlands and watercourses are an
interrelated web of nature essential to an adequate supply of surface and
underground water; to hydrological stability and control of flooding and erosion;
to the recharging and purification of groundwater; and to the existence of many
forms of animal, aquatic and plant life.
217. Queach, 779 A.2d at 150.
218. Id. at 151. In some cases, the functionality approach of ecosystem services-based
regulations has been more specifically linked to public benefits from ecosystem services.
These efforts, too, have been supported in state courts. In the recent case of New Jersey
Shore Builders Ass'n v. Township of Jackson, 970 A.2d 992 (N.J. 2009), the New Jersey
Supreme Court approved a local scheme of preserving tree canopy and biomass production
through the township's tree protection ordinance. Id. at 995. The challenged ordinance
announces that trees are "important cultural, ecological, scenic and economic resource[s]."
TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON, N.J., CODE § 100-1(C) (2010). To protect these values, the
ordinance prohibits the destruction, removal, and injury to trees, except by permit. Id.
§ 100-3(A). The ordinance further allows removal under certain circumstances, subject to
the applicant's preparation of a "tree preservation and removal plan" or payment into a
"tree escrow fund" established to facilitate replanting on public property. Id. §§ 100-4(A),
100-8(B).
At trial, the Township of Jackson (Township) indicated that the purpose of the ordinance
is to recapture the ecosystem services of trees and tree canopy, biomass production, air
filtering, and oxygen production. N.J. ShorebuildersAss'n, 970 A.2d at 999-1000. Given
that these services were relevant on a Township-wide basis, the Township argued that
while on-site replacement would typically be preferable, tree replacement off-site on public
properties would provide many of the same services and would be allowed. Id. at 1005.
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Despite all of the attention being given to Ecosystem function, courts
have illustrated the conceptual difficulties of navigating the transition
from the Environment to Ecosystem Services. 219 The Ohio Valley
controversy may suggest a judicial reluctance to open the field of
environmental law to a functionality analysis. Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that the EPA has reacted to the Ohio Valley decision by
deepening its commitment to an Ecosystem Services approach. Soon
after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ohio Valley, the EPA issued a
broad rejection of the Corps' and the Fourth Circuit's analyses. 220
Specifically, the EPA asserted as follows:
Headwater streams are vital components of the watershed. They
provide critical ecological functions necessary for the health and
productivity of downstream systems. EPA believes that additional
evaluation of the 79 ECP projects is necessary to assess the effectiveness of existing mitigation plans to compensate for anticipated loss of
functions associated with the proposed mining-related burial and mine
through of headwater streams."'

The trial court nonetheless found that a property owner's payment into a fund for off-site
tree replacement does not bear a nexus to the evil sought to be avoided in the ordinance,
namely, canopy loss, erosion, dust creation and lost property values on the property where
trees were removed. See id. at 995. The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial
court improperly narrowed the purpose of the payments, and the fund's purposes of tree
plantings on public property did bear a nexus to the public's interests in the ecosystem
services performed by trees. Id. Preservation and replacement of the ecosystem benefits
from trees was, to the Township and supreme court, an ecosystem and community-wide
benefit in that the ill effects were shared and felt beyond property boundaries. Id. Such
a purpose was found to be squarely within the traditional police powers. Id. at 1002.
219. See, e.g., Hensley v. N.C. Dep't Envtl. & Nat. Res., 685 S.E. 2d 570 (N.C. 2009),
rev'd on other grounds, 698 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 2010). In some cases, courts have shown
willingness to defer to agency expertise in fashioning functionality regulations. See, e.g.,
id. Hence, in Hensley a North Carolina regulation identified and protected the value of
particular streams as "[s]uitable for natural trout propogation and maintenance of stocked
trout," and the North Carolina Court of Appeals was not inclined to question the
certification of the stream segment at issue as a trout water, without regard for the trout
population's actual existence in the stream. Id. at 574-76 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
220. See Letter from Peter S. Silva, Assistant Admin., Office of Water, EPA, to Jo-Ellen
Darcy, Acting Secretary of the Army (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://water.epa.gov/
lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wetland-pdfepa Letter to.Army finalECP09-30-09
.pdf. On September 11, 2009, the EPA identified a list of pending Appalachian surface
mining applications that might require additional review. Id. On September 30, 2009, the
EPA delivered a letter to the Army confirming that a list of 79 pending mining applications
would be subject to further review to ensure, among other things, that any compensatory
mitigation measures justifying permit approval adequately offset lost aquatic functions.
Id.

221. Id.
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The EPA later issued a proposed determination on the Spruce No. 1
Surface Mine in Logan County, West Virginia, regarding its intention to
withdraw or restrict use of certain waters in the mining operations.
The tone in which the EPA framed its response to the Corps' position
suggests the problem as one of competency:
An understanding of the adverse impacts of the proposed project
requires an understanding of the nature and importance of headwater
streams and their contribution to the overall health of the watershed
and to wildlife living in the watershed. Headwater streams play a
significant role in the ecology of the Appalachian region. They are
sources of clean, abundant water for larger streams and rivers and
provide active sites for biogeochemical processes that support both
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. The benefits of healthy headwaters
are cumulative as the critical ecological functions of many small
streams flowing into the same river system are necessary to maintain
ecological integrity of the larger stream and river systems. Ecosystem
functions performed by headwaters are lost when the headwater
stream is buried or removed. These functions are lost not only to the
headwater stream itself, but also to downstream ecosystems. Some of
the functions of Appalachian headwater streams include interfacing
with the terrestrial environment and transformation of organic matter
from the surrounding landscape (such as leaf litter) into nutrients;
storing and retaining nutrients, organic matter, and sediments;
exporting water and nutrients downstream; and moderating flow rate
and temperature.2 2 1
The EPA specifically criticized the manner in which the Army Corps
"only accounts for the physical aspects of stream condition and completely ignores the interrelationship of water chemistry and biological
resources in stream functioning.""'
The EPA suggested that an
unassessed compensatory mitigation ratio of one-to-one replacement
would be inadequate to replace lost stream functions, an issue that the
EPA noted "continue [s] to be effectively ignored."225

222. EPA, Proposed Determination to Prohibit, Restrict, or Deny the Specification, or
the Use for Specification (includingWithdrawal of Specification),of an Area as a Disposal
Site; Spruce No. I Surface Mine, Logan County, West Virginia,ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY
1-2 (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/region3/mtntop/pdf/spruceprop
determ.pdf.
223. Id. at 22-23.
224. Id. at 37.

225. Id. at 38. On April 1, 2010, the EPA issued additional detailed guidance for
improving EPA review of mining operations. Memorandum from Peter S. Silva, Assistant
Admin. for Water, EPA, Detailed Guidance: Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface
Coal Mining Operations under the Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act,
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The EPA's insistence on replacement or protection of stream function-contrasted with the Corps' satisfaction to replace lost headwater
streams with an exactly measured distance of beds, banks, and flowing
water-illustrates the continuing divide between the Environment and
Ecosystem Services. The divide exposes the question of form and
function-the boundedness or the functionality of nature-in laws
governing the treatment of nature. Of course, the disagreement between
the EPA and the Corps may be attributed to growing pains: law is
constantly adjusting to new circumstances (rights, knowledge, social
practices, economic standards, and so on). However, we might also
reasonably expect that this shift in our understanding of nature is
problematic for property.

4. Thinking About Ecosystem Services as Incidents of Property
Without Boundaries. A conflict between Ecosystem Services and
Property is inevitable. Under Ecosystem Services, value is dependent on
the characteristics of the ecosystem throughout the ecosystem, so it is
not limited to a parcel's transformative value. More specifically, the
Ecosystem Services approach recognizes that the value added of
ecological goods and services may derive from services performed off-site
and likewise recognizes that the functionality of ecosystems on-site will
impact the value of goods and services benefitting other properties. As
such, the Ecosystem Services manner of attributing value to ecosystem
functionality serves as an articulation of the idea that property interests
may accrue inside another'sproperty boundaries. As abrupt as this idea
may seem, the aim of Ecosystem Services is not to redistribute all
property value away from the owner. Because the Ecosystem Services
analysis values an untransformed and unbounded ecosystem process as
an asset, the Ecosystem Services approach merely reworks the relationship between property boundaries and property value. The Ecosystem
Services approach recognizes value in nature for its pre-capture
characteristics and investigates not the property claims that exist when
property boundaries collide but the manner in which natural processes
provide something of value to properties on both sides of a boundary.
Property boundaries play a role in this calculus, such as in determining who has geographical control over (or responsibility for) areas of
ecosystem contribution and hence the ability to transform ecological

and the Environmental Justice Executive Order (April 1, 2010), availableat http://www.
epa.gov./owow/wetlands/guidance/pdflappalachian-mtntop-mining-detailed.pdf. This latter
guidance provided for benchmark water quality triggers and indicated the EPA's intention
to further embolden the review of mining impacts and compensatory mitigation to ensure
that mitigation replaces lost stream functions and not just stream flow. Id. at 23.
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functions (or duty to refrain from doing so). However, modifying the role
of boundaries is a necessity due to the Ecosystem Services position that
for many ecosystem services, "it is not possible, necessary, or appropriate
to delineate clear spatial boundaries between aquatic and related
terrestrial systems. Indeed, to the extent that there is an identifiable
boundary, it is often dynamic in both space and time."
When an
owner's interests rely on services performed on a neighboring parcel or
farther upstream, the Ecosystem Services approach to property
articulates an economic basis for tracing responsibility for the lost
services across property boundaries.2 27
An important question concerns the adaptability of property to an
Ecosystem Services understanding of nature: does the Ecosystem
Services' effort to attribute natural processes as assets translate into
nature as a property right?2" In his extensive writings about the

226.

CAVSARTE, supra note 152, at 59 (citation omitted).

227. One objection to the Ecosystem Services approach is that one of its goals, if not
its main purpose, is to provide a measure of value for natural processes and goods that is
comparable to values assessed in the marketplace. Under the objection, the very act of
valuing ecological processes in dollars represents the failure of social norms to recognize
non-anthropocentric value in nature. However, it is not clear that such an objection is
particularly persuasive against the Ecosystem Services approach to valuation:
The objection may be based partly on the false presumption that quantifying
dollar values for natural "assets" automatically implies that they can or should be
traded in private markets. However, natural assets are, for the most part, public
goods. They are often "non-rival" (one person's use does not preclude other's use)
and "non-exclusive" (it is difficult or impossible to exclude people from benefiting
from the services). These characteristics are the economist's classic criteria for
"public" goods, and most economists would agree that using unfettered private
markets to manage these assets will not maximize social welfare.
Robert Costanza et al., The Value of New Jersey's Ecosystem Services and NaturalCapital

3 (2006), availableat http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dsr/naturalcap/nat-cap-2.pdf.
228. Often enough, to suggest that an understanding of nature is "new" is to indicate
that it has not been well received or is otherwise problematic because of its divergence
from existing concepts of property, law, or nature itself. As noted by J.B. Ruhl and John
Nagle, there is a dearth of case law prior to 2000 enforcing a freedom from nuisance right
involving ecosystem services. John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainageto Wetlands
Regulation to Ecological Nuisances to EnvironmentalEthics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787,
798-99 (2007-2008); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753,
756 (2008). However, to say there are few to no cases applying common law causes to
produce ecosystem services values is not to say that law has failed to implement the
underlying understanding of nature proposed in the ecosystem services approach. Many
of the searches for common law expressions of ecosystem services, however, have been
troubled. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water's Edge: Limits to "Ownership"
ofAquatic Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE?, supra

note 6, at 201, 206 (examining the potential of the federal navigation servitude, the public
trust doctrine, and "nonownership doctrine" to bridge the gap between property and
functionality).
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capacity of the common law to account for Ecosystem Services, J.B. Ruhl
suggests that common law nuisance can accommodate property rights
and remedies because nuisance is flexible enough to account for
changing social norms and needs.2 ' This approach is consistent with
the reflection in this Article on the role of boundaries to property.
Nuisance is fluid, a foundation that is especially helpful for Ecosystem
Services, which remains an emerging scientific paradigm: nuisance
recognizes that property rights hinge on growing and emerging bodies
of information that affect our perception of what constitutes harm, what
causes harm, and what values should be reflected in remedies to
particular harms.2 30 In addition, the nuisance approach to a legal
construction for Ecosystem Services will take into account location, landuse needs for the area, and the existing and compatible surrounding
uses, all of which provide context for the appropriateness of a particular
land-use choice. Nuisance, which offers an effective framework for
thinking about property without boundaries, allows law to conceptualize
the demands that Ecosystem Services makes of property.
Of course, it is completely predictable that few cases to date have
expressly addressed the loss of ecosystem services as an impairment of
property rights, as property has not historically borne the weight of
ecosystem services as a property value. On the other hand, this is not
to say that courts have been unwilling to connect ecosystem services
with property interests: property and nature are codependent, so even
the property regime could not avoid recognizing ecosystem processes.2 31
Take, for instance, the Supreme Court's express finding in the 1900 case
of Leovy v. United States2 32 that the function of wetlands to the
ecosystem and to other property interests requiredprotection against the

229. See Ruhl, supra note 228, at 753-56. J.B. Ruhl inquires as to whether the common
law is suitably equipped to offer plaintiffs a cause of action against another property owner

for deprivation of or interference with ecosystem services. Id. at 761. Ruhl argues from
a framework of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and while

he suggests an intent to formulate an ecosystem services analysis into the "background
principles" of property, to the extent that such is his project, it certainly seems to be the
right direction. See id. at 761-77.
230.

See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

329, 351 (1996) (suggesting a vision of property that is "more fluid and less fenced-in,"
which would illustrate "more of the qualities of flexibility, reasonableness and moderation,
attentiveness to others, and cooperative solutions to common problems").
231.

Thus, Ruhl's hesitancy is admittedly due to a lack of case law awarding nuisance

remedies in matters involving impacts to ecosystem services. See Ruhl, supra note 228.
He concludes that we may be in need of a new category of nuisance claim-an ecosystem
services nuisance. Id. at 762.
232. 177 U.S. 621 (1900).
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owners' actions (or inaction) relative to those ecosystem services.2 33 In
Leovy the Court established a need to eliminate particular ecosystem
characteristics 2 4 and as such may be cast as an anti-environmental
decision, but its relevance here is undeniable: nuisance law has long
recognized the relevance of ecosystem services to property, and the
public need for such services has correspondingly acted as a limitation
on private property rights. Moreover, in the century since Leovy, we
have come to a different understanding of wetlands, one that still affects
public needs and that illustrates the importance of Ruhl's insistence that
nuisance is adaptable to an Ecosystem Services understanding of
nature.23 ' Robin Kundis Craig has confirmed this transition in her
observations about wetlands jurisdiction since Rapanos v. United
States,2 36 noting in her analysis of United States v. Cundiff 3 1 that
Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus analysis made clear that the
Cundiffs' wetlands are performing human waste treatment services, for
wastes that are presumably ( .

.

. the court gives no background) not of

the Cundiffs' own making but that could severely impair downstream
aquatic ecosystem function."s
Having come to this point, it is also worthwhile to mention that
nuisance is not the only property doctrine that can accommodate the
Ecosystem Services understanding of nature. When we couple nuisance
with other property incidents that are specifically designed to navigate
and accommodate competing interests in resources, we get a deeper
picture of how property can value land, air, and water for the services
they provide. Albeit in a piecemeal fashion, property has laid some
groundwork principles that support an assertion that when property
focuses on ecological function, the legal status of boundaries may be
understood as subservient to property expectations grounded in
Ecosystem Services.
For instance, riparian rights suggest that law may be able to prioritize
water uses that have a lesser impact on ecosystem function. Water
allocation in the eastern states was intended to resolve competing
opportunities to the use of water abutting riparian lands when use was
effectively limited by the rule that no person is entitled to deprive others

233.
234.

Id. at 636.
See id.

235. See Ruhl, supra note 228, at 762.
236. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
237. 480 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
238. Robin Kundis Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional
Approach to Clean Water Act Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 38 ENvrL. L. 635, 664 (2008)

(reporting on the impact of Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, including an analysis of Cundiff, 480
F. Supp. 2d 940).

2011]

THREE STORIES ABOUT NATURE

597

of an opportunity to use.2 39 Under the "reasonable use" approach to
riparian rights allocation, riparian owners are entitled to the full use of
the watercourse for beneficial purposes, so long as such use does not
unreasonably interfere with the opportunities of others to engage water
in beneficial uses on their properties.24 0 Under this scheme, reasonableness is a question for adjudication: 24 1' an actor's use of water is not
subject to bare capture, and instead courts balance context, use, and
need.242 More importantly, courts have recognized that the benefits of
riparian ownership, and the uses to which riparian rights might be put,
may depend upon the character and functions of the particular

waterbody. Hence, in Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 24 3 plaintiff riparian
owners claimed interference with their use of lake waters "exclusively for
recreational purposes-picnicking, bathing, boating and fishing-for its
officers and employees and their families."24 4 The trial court ordered
injunctive relief against a competing user of lake water for irrigation of
the user's citrus fields. 24 5 The court recognized that under the doctrine
of riparian rights, "each riparian owner has the right to use the water
in the lake for all lawful purposes, so long as his use of the water is not
detrimental to the rights of other riparian owners." 24 6 Furthermore,
tilt is immaterial what use is made of the property, if the use be lawful,
for there may be certain special rights peculiar to each shore owner
according to the nature of his possession and the character and value

239. See Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 122 A.2d 233, 239 (N.J.
1956). In general, riparian rights states are divided into one or the other of two particular
adaptations: the "natural flow" theory and the "reasonable use" doctrine. Id. at 240.
Under the natural flow theory, riparian owners were entitled to receive the natural flow
of water in both quantity and quality. Id.
240. Id. at 240.
241. Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335, 342 (1862) ("Every
owner of land through which a stream of water flows is entitled to the use and enjoyment
of the water, and to have the same flow in its natural and accustomed course, without
obstruction, diversion, or corruption. The right extends to the quality as well as to the
quantity of the water.").
242. See Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956) ("Social progress and
the common wellbeing are in actuality better served by a just and right balancing of the
competing interests according to the general principles of fairness and common sense
243. 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
244. Id. at 392-93.
245. Id. at 393-94.
246. Id. at 394; see also Okaw Drainage Dist. of Champaign & Douglas Cnty., Ill. v.
Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 882 F.2d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Elach riparian owner
is entitled to make a reasonable use of the river, with what is 'reasonable' depending on
the balance between his own needs and those of the other riparian owners.").

MERCER LAW REVIEW

598

[Vol. 62

of his improvements. The fact that on[e] riparian owner may choose to
use the water in the lake for recreational purposes while another may
desire to divert it for an artificial use such as irrigation, will not give
the latter a superior right to take water to the detriment of the former,
for in this jurisdiction there is no distinction in respect to use between
a farm and a summer residence. The use of lands bordering on, and the
waters of, such a lake, for the purpose of pleasure, recreation and
health constitutes such a use of the lake as to command a remedy for
an unlawful interference with its natural condition."
The injunction was affirmed because under the circumstances, the
claimant's use required instream water, and the instream water uses
would be impaired by the diversion."' In this case, a riparian rights
analysis resulted in a priority for nonconsumptive water uses based on
the circumstances and need for the resource: the lake was too small "to
allow water to be pumped therefrom for irrigating purposes without
consequent damage to other riparian owners."249
A second illustration of accommodation between Ecosystem Services
and property relates property rights to natural conditions in geologic
support. Legal protection of a property's lateral support offers an
incident of a property right that preserves the ability of owners to
maximize property expectations; lateral support protects the owner's
geological expectations and conditions of the land.2 50 The rights
conferred as lateral support, however, appear to bear an inverse
correlation to the boundedness of land exhibited in the Property scheme.
In Williams v. Southern Railway Co.," the defendant excavated its
property alongside the plaintiff's parcel, ultimately resulting in
subsidence and injury to the plaintiff.25 2 The Tennessee Court of
Appeals found liability on the principle that
every owner of land has the right to naturally necessary lateral support
from the adjoining soil, and if a landowner removes the soil from his
own land so near the land of his neighbor that his neighbor's soil will
crumble away under its own weight, he is liable for damages naturally
resulting therefrom, including damage to structures on the subsiding
land, without the necessity of showing negligence."

247.

Taylor, 46 So. 2d at 394.

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

251. 396 S.W.2d 98 (1965).
252.

Id. at 99.

253. Id. at 99-100.

§ 817 (1979).
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Under this rule, any excavation that causes adjoining, unimproved land
to collapse will subject the excavator to strict liability, representing the
common law view that a property owner is absolutely entitled to lateral
support from the adjoining land.2" Proof of negligence in the excavation is not required.255 Accordingly, the doctrine imposes liability on
one's neighbors for transformative improvements; thus, the doctrine
favors leaving land in its natural state and vests owners with the right
to receive geologic support services."'
A third area of property that provides some insights for an Ecosystem
Services-based property scheme relates to property rights in airspace.
Rights to airspace, which were historically governed by ad coelum and
the need to protect owners from permanent airspace intrusions,257 were
dramatically altered by the invention of human flight. With the
commercialization of air travel, courts adopted a pragmatic approach to
airspace rights, finding that ad coelum did not support exclusive
boundaries into the heavens; the doctrine protected property into (and
only up to) space that the owner had a reasonable expectation of use and
occupancy. 25 8 The demise of a strict, boundary-based approach to ad
coelum opened airspace for an inquiry into other uses for airspace-such
as for the passage of light and air. Courts have since recognized that
property interests can compete with an underlying owner's interests in
neighboring airspace. Hence, in Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos

254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817 cmt. b.
255. Id.
256. What is interesting about lateral support rights is the manner in which they favor
land uses that leave nature to perform its services: overtaxing the land's natural support
operates as a waiver of the absolute right. Sime v. Jensen, 7 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Minn.
1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 817

cmt. c (stating that naturally

necessary support "does not include the support needed because of the presence of artificial
additions to . . . the surrounding land"). Of course, the improving owner is not deprived
of all rights. Instead, by making alterations to the natural surface or subsurface of land,
the claimant's rights are determined by whether the neighbor's removal of support was
done in a reasonable fashion and whether the claimant's own activities were the cause of
the lateral weakness.

See 8-69 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS

§ 69.04(b)(2Xiii) (West 2010). The emphasis remains on the owner's entitlement to enjoy
the benefits of natural geological support.
257. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth,55 UCLA L. REV. 979,980-81
(2008) (stating that ownership above and below the land's surface derives from the canon
"cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, . . . meaning that the rights of the

surface owner extend upward to the heavens (ad coelum) and downward to the center of
the earth (ad inferos)").

258. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 202-03 (6th Cir. 1932); see also
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388-90 (Mass. 1930).
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Verdes, 2 59 the City of Rancho Palos Verdes's view-protection ordinance
was upheld against constitutional challenges that the ordinance invaded
property. 260
The ordinance established foliage height limitations,
prohibited property owners from allowing vegetation to impair particular
views, and allowed an injured neighbor to apply for a "view restoration
permit" to compel the offending owner to trim trees to an extent
necessary to protect the view.26 1 The court of appeals in Echevarrieta
dismissed the takings claim on grounds that the ordinance's protection
of viewshed interests, and essentially vesting of airspace interests in
others' properties, fell short of a physical invasion.262 Protection of the
neighbor's interests in scenic vistas without regard for property
boundaries did not burden any right that the owner may have.2 63
Ultimately, the idea of property in ecosystems will require some
adjustment to accommodate the manner in which Ecosystem Services
identifies and values natural processes. Yet property often adjusts to
emerging visions of nature, property, and society. Indeed, the integration of ecosystem services and property might be modeled after the
integration compelled when the Village of Euclid, Ohio, exercised the
police power to create land use districts."' Over the district court's
reservation that property exists only when owners have a relatively
unfettered right to control and use land within property boundaries,265
Justice Sutherland approved "the wisdom or sound policy" of zoning as
an appropriate response to the "problems [that] have developed" from
changing technologies and social and economic circumstances. 2 66 To
secure the public welfare against such challenges, courts have recognized
that the police power authorizes the regulation of property use impacts
across borders when burdens and benefits are widely distributed and an
average reciprocity of advantage will frequently justify burdening the
What the Supreme
tendency to transform natural conditions.'
Court's decision in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.

259. 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
260. Id. at 171-72.
261. Id. at 167.
262. Id. at 171.
263. See id. at 171-72 (rejecting the claim to privacy rights infringement and asserting
that the ordinance would likely have an indirect increase on property values.).
264. See generally Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For
an insightful narrative of the history of Euclid's zoning ordinance, see MICHAEL ALLAN
WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER (2008).

265. Ambler Realty Corp. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924) (quoting
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917)).
266. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-95.
267. See, e.g., id. at 389-90.
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ultimately approved, and what has largely led the body of law governing
land use control ever since, is the authority to control the character of
private land uses to avoid impairing the natural and built infrastructure
services so that the benefits of such services could be captured on a
These principles can be applied through Ecosystem
broad scale.'
Services: property values may be significantly influenced by the
ecosystem's capacity to accommodate the owner's intended uses (when
such uses might otherwise cause off-site impacts from septic, agricultural, or stormwater discharges) and provide needed services for the
intended uses (when particular uses might depend on productive water
and soil for food production or geological stability for structure support).
As law becomes more settled in recognizing the rights and injuries to
property that account for ecosystem goods and services, we should not
be surprised at the resulting irrelevancy of property boundaries to the
character of property rights. In evaluating a takings claim (or other
compensable loss of property value), for instance, the Ecosystem Services
approach will require a more searching analysis of the ground, and not
just the market, to determine whether the owner is injured and to what
extent the injury might be to a right in property. This adaptation is
making an entrance into the courts as well. As J.B. Ruhl noted in his
examination of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,2" the finding of ecological
nuisance has immense and devastating implications for Lucas claimants
who propose developments that transform ecosystems.2 70 On remand
in Palazzolo, the Rhode Island Superior Court disparaged the plaintiff's
judgment of lost property value from the regulation specifically because
the plaintiff's appraiser failed to account for the "diminished amenity
value" that would result from filling in the salt marsh.2 71 As the
superior court noted, "Common sense as well as the evidence adduced at
trial necessarily leads to the conclusion that Plaintiff would benefit from
an 'average reciprocity of advantage' as a result of limited development
of the parcel in question."2 72 Regulated property owners will have a

268. Although there are differences between the schemes, it is certainly plausible to
think that the Ecosystem Services approach merely implements a more sophisticated
understanding of the environment in calculating reciprocity. Under Ecosystem Services,
the value-added component of situatedness depends less on distance to public infrastructure-roads, sewer, schools, and so forth-than the property's location relative to available
ecosystem goods and services provided by the functional regional ecosystem.
269. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
270. J.B. Ruhl, The "BackgroundPrinciples"of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services-Did Lucas Open Pandora'sBox?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 525, 541-43 (2006).

271. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *11 (R.I. Super.
Ct. July 5, 2005).
272. Id. (footnote omitted).
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more difficult and complex burden to show the causal relationship
between land-use regulations-ones that protect ecosystem services-and
lost property values.
Another revealing example has been offered by the New York courts,
in which the New York Court of Appeals held that the regulation of
ecosystem services will often stay clear of property rights that accrue
under this scheme. In Smith v. Town of Mendon,2 73 the Town of
Mendon (Town) defended development restrictions arising from
regulations implementing certain environmental protection overlay
districts (EPODs) in the zoning code. 274 The overlay districts were
intended to control adverse impacts on the environment from development, ensuring resident safety, improving water quality, preventing the
loss of natural resources, and preserving wildlife habitats.2 75 Several
of the overlays that applied to the plaintiff's property pertained to the
presence of steep slopes, floodplains, wooded areas, and a watercourse.
The EPODs regulated construction, vegetation clearing, excavation,
grading, and stormwater discharges within the district and subjected the
application to performance standards. The plaintiffs were required to
show the absence of reasonable alternatives and that the development
would not impair the environmental values at issue.2 76
The Smiths did not intend to build in any of the EPODs, and as such,
the Town Planning Board found that the proposed site plan would not
impair the sensitive environments on the property so long as the
sensitive environment remained undisturbed. Nevertheless, to secure
the protection of the sensitive areas, the Town required the Smiths to
The
file a conservation restriction on areas covered by the EPODs.'
court questioned the Smiths' claimed injury, stating that it was
uncertain whether "the conservation restriction would have any effect
whatsoever on the market value of the . . . property."2 1 More importantly, the court rejected the Smiths' exaction claim, noting that both

273. 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).
274. Id. at 1215-16. The Town adopted eleven such districts, including the following:
wetlands, steep slope, watercourse, scenic corridors, historic and archeological site, waste
disposal site, woodlot, flood damage prevention, soils susceptible to ponding, geological
feature, and wildlife corridors and habitat. TowN OF MENDON, N.Y., CODE §§ 200-21 to
200-32 (2008), available at http://www.ecode360.comPcustld=ME0067.
275. TowN OF MENDON, N.Y., CODE § 200-21(A).
276. Smith, 822 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
277. Id. The proposed restrictions incorporated the performance standards and use
restrictions contained in the zoning code, but they also provided for reasonable Town access
to the property, restricted the property in perpetuity, and allowed greater enforcement
powers than the Town enjoyed under the zoning code. Id. at 1216.
278. Id. at 1221.
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Dolan v. City of Tigard27 9 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 280 involved conditions that required the conveyance of the right to
exclude others, which is "the most important 'stick' in the proverbial
bundle of property rights."2 8 ' In contrast, the injury alleged by the
Smiths merely involved the impacts of foreclosing possible future
development in ways that would impair functions of the sensitive
environments.2 82 The Smiths retained the rights to possess and
exclude others, and as such, the condition exacted from the Smiths "may
be among the more modest and fragile twigs in the bundle of property
rights, if it is a property right at all."2 " Here, the court rejected the
notion that a conveyance of property interests to preserve ecosystem
characteristics could constitute an invasion of property.284
V.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between our understanding of nature and how we
allocate rights to property is a necessary one. By looking at the ways
Ecosystem Services diverges from other descriptions of nature, this
Article has explored how property may react and adapt to the values
embodied in this emerging story. Ecosystem Services casts the character
of nature as ecosystem functionality, the value of nature as economic
value of goods and services, and the use of nature's goods and services
as a benefit to human well-being. Ecosystem Services, which poses
ecosystem functionality as an asset, provides an articulation of property
value's dependence on ecosystem influences. As such, challenges to
Ecosystem Services will invariably arise where the influence arises on
another's property. If the relationship between functionality and
economic value proposed in Ecosystem Services is sound, property will
conceive of this asset by finding property interests in others' property.
This is property without boundaries, in which boundaries become less
relevant not just for the process of identifying nature, but also for
identifying property interests.
An Ecosystem Services analysis contextualizes the boundedness of
nature and largely leaves the property owner with benefits and
liabilities that stem from the ground (such as location, ecosystem
function, air, water, and grade) but accrue to individual owners (and the

public welfare) in an average and reciprocal fashion. Ecosystem Services

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Smith, 822 N.E.2d at 1219 (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, and Nollan, 483 U.S. 825).
See id.
Id. at 1220.
See id.
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reflects the reasoning behind the average reciprocity justification but
does so by specifying benefits and burdens that hinge upon the
complexity and interrelatedness of the various services at issue. Because
the intent of an Ecosystem Services regulatory scheme is to recognize
these burdens and benefits in conjunction with the whole of the
ecosystem, and not as individual and piecemealed values, an Ecosystem
Services analysis will emphasize that property value is relative to the
ecosystem.
Property has already begun to adapt to the Ecosystem Services scheme
by adjusting to reflect the manner that interests in natural processes
circumvent boundaries. There have been (and will be) challenges, of
course, as law struggles to understand the character of nature to which
property makes a claim. However, the idea that the law must grasp is
that under Ecosystem Services, nature is not placed in competition with
property. Nature is not a property defect; it is a property condition that
is conceptually unseverable from property and incapable of being
ignored.

